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The purpose of this chapter is to create a clear understanding of the research 
problems and how they will be analyzed. It consists of seven sections: background, 
problem identification and analysis planning, purpose of study, research questions, 
methodology, scope and limitations, and report overview. Section A, Background, 
provides brief information about the U.S./TN FMS program. Section B, Problem 
Identification and Analysis Planning, explores the potential problems in U.S./TN FMS 
and explains how those problems are analyzed. Section C, Purpose of Study, describes 
the overarching aim of this research. Section D, Research Questions, provides the 
research questions that this research tries to answer. Section E, Methodology, explains 
the methods that are used in analysis. Section F, Scope and Limitations, expresses the 
scope of this research while mentioning the limitations that affects the results. Section G, 
Report Overview, summarizes this report. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The last century has seen exponential advancements in technology and its 
increased significance in arms sales. The importance of arms sales increases with cutting-
edge arms technology. Regardless of the parties—governments or companies—involved 
in the transaction, it is much more than just a commercial activity. The transactions play a 
vital role in a government’s foreign and domestic policies. In today’s complex strategic 
environment and delicate foreign-relationship arena, purchaser countries must make 
careful decisions among numerous choices. Source selection may include many 
considerations such as a system’s total acquisition cost, budgetary implications and 
funds, delivery schedule, performance, life-cycle logistic support, interoperability with 
current systems and allied forces, industrial utilization, and politics (Defense Instute of 
Security Assistance Management [DISAM], 2015, p. 15-1). Most countries prefer to use 
their allies as sources of arms procurement for various political, economic, and 
interoperability reasons. Since arms sales deal with tremendous amounts of money and 
extensive labor, their role in domestic policy cannot be ignored from the perspectives of 
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employment, capital formation, as well as research and development (Perfilio, 2007, p. 
3).  
As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, Turkey has an 
extensive arms sales history and deep ties with the United States. Turkey’s critical geo-
strategic and geo-political location at the heart of Afro-Eurasia makes it mandatory to 
have potent armed forces to remain a permanent, stable, and prosperous country (Turkish 
Naval Forces [TNF], 2015, Preface). Turkey has always aimed to be a deterrent force, 
ready for any conflict near one of the world’s most problematic regions. In order to reach 
its national security goals and accomplish NATO missions successfully, Turkey has 
sought to use U.S. Security Assistance (SA) as a tool to satisfy its military needs. The 
United States became a major arms supplier for its allies, especially after the Second 
World War, once it was determined that the transfer of defense articles could be used as a 
primary tool to carry out its foreign policy and national security strategy (DISAM, 2015). 
Significantly, the foundation of SA and all other military aid programs started with the 
Truman Doctrine: Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947. Before this act, the United States 
“had never before entered into a formal assistance program with a foreign state during 
general peacetime conditions” (DISAM, 2015, p. Appendix 2, p. 4). Therefore, the arms-
sale relationship between the United States and Turkey can be traced back to the roots of 
SA. As a result, Turkish Naval Forces have entered into many arms transactions with the 
United States to modernize its fleets (Kackar, 1995). 
Today, there are many U.S.-originated defense articles that require continuous 
logistical support, such as Perry-class frigates and Seahawk helicopters, existing in the 
TN’s inventory, which creates a constant commercial relationship between both 
countries. This support has been realized mostly through the Department of Defense 
(DOD)’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and includes but is not limited to repair 
and spare parts, maintenance, support equipment and services, and publications. Given 
that “the largest portion of weapon system life-cycle cost (approximately 60%-70%)” 
comes from operation and support activities, according to the DOD (2011), rigorous 
efforts to improve the effectiveness of these life-cycle support activities should be an 
important concern for the customer agencies (p. 70). As a customer with a limited budget, 
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Turkish Naval Forces (TNF) have been providing maritime security and “regional and 
global peace and stability within [the] UN, NATO and other multinational organizations” 
(Turkish Naval Forces, 2015, Preface) while trying to achieve the most cost- and 
schedule-effective options for its life-cycle support activities in a time of cost savings, 
budget cuts, and sequestration.  
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS PLANNING 
The relationship between arms suppliers and customers has evolved at an 
incredible pace in response to an ever-changing economic, political, and technological 
environment. However, the U.S. FMS program could not keep up with this pace and 
evolved more slowly than its surrounding circumstances (Jaafar, Malallah, & Sharif, 
2004). Constant operations and missions, especially in the Middle East, are wearing 
down older systems and creating capability gaps. In addition to the need to quickly fill 
these gaps, fast technological developments render some existing systems obsolete. 
According to Mehta (2015), the timeline and the very slow speed of the FMS processes 
lead to customer complaints, which are not new but more urgent than before. 
The TN has many U.S. end items in its inventory as a result of the alliance with 
the United States and NATO. For life-cycle support of these items, the TN uses FMS 
Direct Requisitioning Procedures (DRP) and Repair of Repairables (ROR) procedures to 
procure support materiel and repair services. However, problems in the FMS process and 
procedures combined with political events have resulted in that TN diversified in 
suppliers. 
In light of this, this research illustrates the existing state and effectiveness of the 
FMS DRP, ROR, and Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR) procedures while identifying 
alternative means to meet the TN’s needs. In doing so, this research conducts a literature 
review about the history of the U.S./TN FMS program and associated procedures as well 
as provides alternative methods to obtain U.S. materiel and repair services. Statistical 
analysis of the TN’s DRP, ROR, and SDR transactions should show the current state of 
these procedures. Findings of these activities will conclude the research.  
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C. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to analyze and examine the current state of the 
U.S./TN FMS program with an emphasis on DRP, ROR, and SDR procedures. This 
research identifies potential problems in this program and associated procedures while 
exploring potential alternative methods to obtain the same U.S. materiel and repair 
services. This study, then, offers information and recommendations relevant to decision-
making authorities, which can be utilized to improve the U.S./TN FMS program and 
procedures in future strategies and policies. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to satisfy the purpose of this research, there are two specific questions 
that need to be addressed. These questions are as follows: 
 What are the general picture and current state of the U.S./TN FMS 
program as well as the current state of its associated procedures? 
 What are the alternative methods and improvements that can be 
considered to make the current state better? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
To answer the research questions, the research methodology includes a literature 
review on the U.S./TN FMS program with associated procedures and potential 
alternatives, a process analysis of these subjects, and a statistical analysis of the historical 
records of the U.S./TN FMS DRP, ROR, and SDR. The sources cited in the literature 
review include but are not limited to governmental and commercial publications, books, 
policy guides, reports, news articles, and periodicals. 
The process analysis breaks down the FMS program and procedures into their 
constituent parts to show how these processes operate and what the purchaser’s and the 
United States’ inputs include. The process analysis was conducted to determine potential 
problems in the FMS structure that reduce the efficiency of the program and prevent it 
from reaching intended goals.  
The statistical analysis of the historical records of the U.S./TN FMS DRP, ROR, 
and SDR transactions involves analytical approaches including descriptive statistics and 
 5
correlation analysis. The statistical analysis was conducted to identify current trends and 
factors affecting the efficiency of the procedures.  
The literature review, process analysis, and statistical analysis are used to draw 
conclusions about the current state of U.S./TN FMS procedures with alternative methods, 
to provide recommendations for improvement of the potential problems, and to determine 
the areas requiring further research.  
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research is to examine the U.S./TN FMS program and 
associated procedures. In doing so, this research analyzes the processes of FMS DRP, 
ROR, and SDR. For the purpose of creating a foundation for the process and statistical 
analysis, a history of the U.S./TN FMS program is provided. A comprehensive 
examination of the entire FMS program requires substantial research that falls beyond the 
focus of this paper. 
This study is limited by the size, quality, and content of the historical data 
samples of the DRP, ROR, and SDR provided by the TN’s Foreign Procurement 
Department. The size and content limitation of this data may affect outcomes and the 
margin of error of the results. Additionally, the study is limited to the procurement for the 
purchaser countries’ navies since some of the processes and procedures are used only by 
the U.S. Navy and may not be applicable to other force structures and organizations of 
both sellers and purchasers. 
While researching this paper, it was discovered that there is not much public 
information available due to the classification policies of the defense article transactions, 
which pose another limitation. 
G. REPORT OVERVIEW 
This report consists of five chapters. Chapter I gave a brief explanation of this 
research. It provided the background information, problem identification and analysis 
planning, purpose of study, methodology, and scope and limitations of the research. It 
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summarized why and how this research was conducted on U.S./TN FMS program and 
associated procedures.  
Chapter II is the literature review and describes the SA and U.S./TN FMS 
programs throughout their history as well as processes and procedures. In addition, 
Chapter II explores potential alternative methods for obtaining the same U.S. materiel 
and repair services. It explains the overall FMS program and associated procedures for 
identifying potential problems that reduce the efficiency of the program.  
Chapter III includes the data summary, statistical methodology, and the analysis 
of U.S./TN FMS procedures and transactions. It presents information about the datasets 
and limitations, a description of how the statistical analysis was conducted, and the 
results of the statistical analysis.  
Chapter IV presents the findings from the literature review and data analysis to 
prepare for the conclusion. Findings obtained from each dataset are presented separately. 
Findings from the literature review includes the history; overall FMS process; the DRP, 
ROR, and SDR; and alternative methods. Chapter V draws conclusions from the findings, 
gives recommendations to improve the existing state, and points out the areas for future 
research. The conclusions include a general picture of U.S./TN FMS program, the 
existing state of U.S./TN FMS-associated procedures, and the suitability of alternatives 
for procurement of U.S. spare parts other than FMS’s DRP and ROR. Recommendations 
consist of needed changes in the FMS program, improving the Turkish national industry 
for spares and repairs, and increasing the use of alternative methods. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of future research needed for more definitive results. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background information about the FMS program, FMS 
DRP, ROR, and SDR procedures, as well as alternative methods to procure U.S. support 
materiel and repair services. It provides information about the history of Security 
Assistance (SA) to Turkey; an overview of FMS organizations, processes, and case types; 
and the U.S. Navy’s organizations for FMS DRP, ROR, and SDR procedures. 
B. WHAT IS U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AND SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE? 
As a governing document, the Security Assistance Management Manual, the 
governing document of SA, has outlined SA as an umbrella for twelve major programs, 
one of which is the FMS program (Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA], 
2003). According to DSCA (2003), SA is 
a group of programs, authorized by law, which allows the transfer of 
military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments. Security 
Assistance transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans 
and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to 
the security and economic well-being of allied Governments and 
international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and 
economic well-being of the United States. (p. 29) 
The Management of Security Cooperation explained Security Cooperation as 
described in Joint Publication1-02:  
All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense 
relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied 
and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency 
access to a host nation. (DISAM 2015, p. 1-1)  
SA programs, including FMS, are fundamental tools for the U.S. government 
(USG) to reinforce its national security strategy and foreign policy objectives (DSCA, 
2003). There are two main laws governing security assistance: the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (DISAM, 2015). 
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C. HISTORY 
The roots of SA can be traced back to the Truman Doctrine that emerged shortly 
after the Second World War (WWII). Deeply concerned about armed minorities and 
aggressive communist pressure toward Greece and Turkey, President Truman made an 
historic speech to the U.S. Congress indicating that it was necessary to assist free nations 
in strengthening their economies and militaries to resist both totalitarianism and 
communist aggression. In regards to this goal, Truman made an emergency request for 
military and economic aid of $400 million—equal to $4.3 billion in 2015—for Greece 
and Turkey; the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947 was enacted by the U.S. Congress. As 
the United States had never assisted a foreign state formally in peace time, this act 
initiated a new era for U.S. foreign policy. In the following three years, Turkey and 
Greece received over $600 million—equal to $6 billion in 2015. According to DISAM 
(2015), this legislation required U.S. personnel to “administer the programs within the 
recipient countries”; thus, the Joint Military Advisory and Planning Group was 
established in Turkey, with over 400 U.S. military personnel assigned by mid-1949 
(Appendix 2, p. 4-5). By 1951, this group was renamed the Joint United States Military 
Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) and became the world’s largest military 
assistance and advisory group. The number of JUSMMAT personnel reached its peak by 
1967, with “more than 3,000 military and 2,000 DOD civilian personnel” (Robey & 
Vordermark, 2003-2004, p. 3).  
The major focus of post-WWII U.S. military assistance, according to DISAM 
(2015), was to give away surplus war materiel gratis, in the form of grants and aid under 
the name of the Military Assistance Program (Appendix 2, p. 5). During this era, the U.S. 
Congress also enacted the European Recovery Plan, an endorsement of the Marshall Plan, 
which included $15 billion in loans and grants to 16 European countries in order to help 
recover their economies, which had been damaged significantly from the war (DISAM, 
2015, Appendix 2, p. 6). 
In 1949, NATO was established by 12 founding countries, including the United 
States, with the aim of collective defense. As an outcome of this alliance, NATO 
members benefited from SA by gaining preferential status and some exclusion from arms 
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control legislation. Thus, the majority of U.S. military assistance went to NATO 
members until 1965 (DISAM, 2015, Appendix A2, p. 6). Zanotti (2011) indicated that 
Turkey joined NATO after having acquired the reputation of being “a reliable and 
capable ally,” thanks to its participation and merit in the Korean War (p. 38). After 
joining NATO, Zanotti (2011) suggested, Turkey took advantage of its membership in 
the alliance to modernize its military with the Military Assistance Program (MAP). 
In the late 1950s, U.S. foreign policy broadened and MAP started to include 
friend nations in addition to allied nations. Combined with the declining surplus of post-
war arms stockpiles, changes in U.S. foreign policy and increased self-sufficiency of 
recipient countries put more emphasis on military sales instead of grants and aid in the 
1960s. During the Nixon Administration, various kinds of security-related military and 
economic assistance programs were organized under the term Security Assistance while 
formalizing the main features of today’s SA (DISAM, 2015, Appendix 2, p. 9). In the 
1970s, the U.S. Congress’ persistent request for more efficient management and greater 
control of SA resulted in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act (AECA) of 1976 (DISAM, 2015). Since that time, the AECA has provided the 
governing legislation over SA and has overseen all related activities while defining the 
eligible countries.  
U.S. military assistance to Turkey between 1948 and 1975 totaled more than $4.5 
billion. However, two events during this era damaged the relationship. The first was 
President Lyndon Johnson’s letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in 1964, which 
strongly admonished Turkey not to use any U.S.-supplied equipment in the Cyprus crisis. 
The second was the U.S. Congress’ embargo in 1975 on military assistance grants and 
arms transfers to Turkey, which was a response to the Turkish intervention in the Cyprus 
conflict (Zanotti, 2011, p. 39). The embargo continued until 1978 while critically causing 
a decrease in operational readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces. In response, Turkey 
closed all the U.S.-owned defense facilities in the country, except for those with NATO 
functions, until the end of the embargo (Zanotti, 2011, p. 2). Even though relations 
normalized with the end of the embargo and the U.S.-Turkey Defense and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement in 1980, the bitter taste of these events created two new strategic 
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priorities for Turkey: to diversify arms suppliers and to develop a national defense 
industry (Zanotti, 2011, p. 3). As an immediate reaction, the Turkish Armed Forces 
Foundation and many defense enterprises were established to bolster Turkey’s national 
defense industry. Later it was understood that these efforts were not enough alone; 
therefore, the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries of Turkey was established through 
legislation with continuous funding out of the general budget (Undersecretariat of 
Defense Industries, n.d.-a). 
In fiscal year 1990, according to DISAM (2015), U.S. Congress terminated MAP 
funding and collected all related grants, funds, and aids under the Foreign Military 
Funding Program (FMFP). Soon thereafter, the U.S. Congress upgraded Turkey’s status 
to a mature county in terms of its military’s force and modernization level, thus 
terminating its FMFP with Turkey (Robey & Vordermark, 2003-2004, p. 7). First, all 
FMFP grants changed into loan-only assistance in 1993; then, all loan-only assistance 
ended in 1998. The end of the FMFP funding from the United States along with rigorous 
attempts by Turkey to build up national defense industries caused steep decreases in SA 
for Turkey. With the goal of being fully self-sufficient and autonomous in its defense 
industries, Turkey has sought ways to offset co-production and co-development for 
defense exports—in addition to massive efforts to develop numerous industries (Zanotti, 
2011).  
Thanks to its historical legacy with the United States, Turkey still considers the 
United States a preferred supplier for many systems (Zanotti, 2011, p. 28). However, 
current trends in a recent report by J. Zanotti (2011) from the Congressional Research 
Service indicated that Turkey no longer solely depends on U.S. materiel: 
Turkey’s desire to limit its dependence on any one nation or group of 
nations has led to procurement and industrial cooperation policies that 
have come into tension with U.S. practices regarding co-production and 
technology sharing. As a result, Turkey increasingly solicits competitive 
offers from multiple countries for its defense acquisitions. It seriously 
considers offers from non-U.S.…but that Turkey perceives as being more 
flexible in negotiations and in sharing expertise, and therefore more 
helpful in contributing to Turkey’s long-term goal of industrial self-
reliance….Emphasis on procurement from countries and firms that 
provide offsets, allow co-production, and issue export licenses at the 
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bidding stage…has made it more difficult for U.S. firms to obtain 
contracts. (p. 28) 
Parallel to this, the TN’s perspective on these issues was cited in the Turkish 
Naval Forces Strategy 2016 (TNF, 2015) as:  
For the first time, a battle ship’s full analysis, design, development, and 
integration were done completely nationally thanks to Genesis Project 
initiated in 1998 and National Ship (MILGEM) program initiated in 2004. 
Therefore, retaining these design and ship building capabilities and 
capacities are crucial to Turkish Navy. With these projects, Turkish Navy 
aims to support advancement of the combatant shipbuilding industry, to 
nationally develop technologically and militarily vital systems, and 
institutionalize these efforts to set up substructure that is needed by 
national defense industries. Turkish Navy will prioritize transfer of 
shipbuilding to the national defense industry after the first ship/system is 
produced and its performance is assured by the Turkish Naval Forces. 
Collaboration between military shipyards, national industry, and 
universities will be increased in order to support the efforts of minimizing 
the dependence on foreign defense industry. (p. 34) 
It is important, however, not to forget that until the 2000s, most needs of the 
Turkish Naval Force systems were satisfied through foreign acquisition by either direct 
procurement or programs with offsets that included building some of the ships in the TN 
shipyards. Parallel to this trend, the warfare systems of all ships were acquisitioned from 
foreign industries until the end of the 1990s. (TNF, 2015, p. 34) Therefore, there are 
many U.S.-supplied ships and systems existing in the TN that still require life-cycle 
support transactions through FMS. 
Today, key Turkish defense industries have been established and have reduced 
Turkey’s dependence on external sources. Furthermore, Turkey has started to reap the 
benefits of its resolution to establish defense industries and has even become an exporter 
for some vital defense articles (Undersecretariat of Defense Industries, n.d.b). The aim of 
improving indigenous capabilities is not only for new systems but also for the support of 
existing ones. Every year, exhibitions of imported support materiel have been conducted 
with the aim of minimizing the dependence on external sources in life-cycle support. 
While making every effort to maximize its defense industrial base, Turkey 
continues to experience the bitter taste of political events over intended arms transfers 
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from the United States. As a latest example, since 2012, the U.S. Congress has refused to 
give two Perry-class frigates to Turkey because of the political environment and strong 
lobbyism. Again, in 2015, the U.S. Congress denied Turkey’s request for these ships. 
This trend of denying ships to Turkey was perceived as a new arms embargo by some of 
the Turkish media and “would trigger reaction and risk U.S. defense business in Turkey” 
(Bekdil, 2015). This kind of U.S. political action not only jeopardizes the current 
relationship but also pushes Turkey to speed up its national ship projects. 
In conclusion, Turkey and the United States have a very long relationship in arms 
transfer. As a NATO member, Turkey has used SA programs to satisfy its security needs. 
However, politic decisions regarding U.S. arms transfers to Turkey have harmed the 
relationship to a great degree. Turkey is resolved to build up its own national defense, so 
it does not experience the “troubling and humiliating conditions of embargo” ever again 
(Durmaz, 2014, p. 67). These trends in SA and Turkey’s sensitivity toward foreign 
procurement provide a backdrop for the analysis of the Turkish FMS DRP, ROR and 
SDR transactions. 
D. FMS PROCESS 
This section provides a brief overview of the FMS program, the stages of the 
FMS process, FMS case types, and the U.S. Navy’s organization for FMS. 
1. Overview of FMS Program 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 (22 U.S.C.§ 2751) “authorize[d] 
sales by the United States Government to friendly countries having sufficient wealth to 
maintain and equip their own military forces at adequate strength, or to assume 
progressively larger shares of the costs thereof, without undue burden to their economies” 
(para. 2). The act indicated the rationale for these sales: “It [had become] increasingly 
difficult and uneconomic for any country, particularly a developing country, to fill all of 
its legitimate defense requirements from its own design and production base” (para. 3). 
Contrary to arguments that arms sales create solely a market for the U.S. defense 
industry, explained Gilman (2014) et al., the main purpose of arms sales is to setup strong 
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relationships with foreign nations for the United States to pursue its national security 
strategy and foreign policy goals (p. 3). 
All authorizations and appropriations related to SA are provided under U.S. 
public law. The U.S. Congress, the legislative and overseeing authority, enacts the laws, 
reviews sale requests, and appropriates funds for SA. The president, chief policy maker 
of U.S. foreign policy, is responsible for determining which countries and organizations 
are eligible, entering into contractual agreements with other countries and organizations, 
and notifying Congress of these contracts. Most of the authority and responsibilities over 
SA are delegated to the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The DOS is responsible for making a determination for budget requests and sales 
programs based on a country’s size and scope. The DOS also has the authority to approve 
defense export licenses for U.S. defense industries. The authority for entering into 
contracts with eligible countries is delegated to the Secretary of Defense. This authority 
further delegates tasks to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA 
executes all SA for the DOD; thus, it directs, administers, and executes the FMS program 
(DSCA, 2003). DSCA published the Security Assistance Management Manual (DOD 
5105-38.M) as a principal guide and mandatory reference for all DOD components. The 
manual provides “guidance for the administration and implementation of security 
assistance and related activities in compliance with the AECA, the Foreign Assistance 
Act (FAA), and other related statutes and directives” (DSCA, 2003, p. 2).  
Among the programs related to SA, FMS has had a unique key role since it 
involves government-to-government defense sales established via formal contracts or 
agreements with eligible foreign purchasers. DSCA (2003) defined FMS as follows: 
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is that part of Security 
Assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and 
conducted using formal contracts or agreements between the United States 
Government (USG) and an authorized foreign purchaser. These contracts, 
called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs), are signed by both the 
USG and the purchasing Government or international organization; and 
provide for the sale of defense articles and/or defense services (to include 
training) usually from Department of Defense (DOD) stocks or through 
purchase under DOD-managed contracts. As with all Security Assistance, 
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the FMS program supports United States (U.S.) foreign policy and 
national security objectives. (p. 85) 
DSCA (2003) referred to Turkey as “FMS Eligible,” and “Excess Defense 
Articles (EDA) Eligible” (p. 87-96). In addition to defense articles and services, 
technology must also be allowed for transfer to eligible countries and organizations 
(DSCA, 2003). 
USG conducts all necessary activities related to arms sales with FMS purchaser 
countries in the same manner it conducts these activities for itself. To avoid passing costs 
onto the U.S. taxpayer, the USG does not profit from these arms sales but charges 
administrative fees to the nation purchasing through the FMS. It can be said that the FMS 
process is conducted on a non-profit basis for the benefit of the purchaser and at no cost 
to U.S. taxpayers. The USG charges a certain percentage of the total price of the 
transaction as an administrative surcharge without disclosing the administrative efforts 
and their actual costs (DSCA, 2003). 
The FMS process uses the existing domestic DOD structure (DSCA, 2003). The 
domestic DOD structure has various players. For this reason, DISAM (2015) outlined, 
“policies, databases, and organizational elements for support of FMS vary among DOD 
agencies” (p. 5-1). This complexity makes it is very important to understand the U.S. 
Navy’s supply system and FMS organization in addition to understanding the FMS 
process. 
2. Stages of the FMS Process 
All acquisition processes, regardless of their origin, begin with requirement 
development. To fulfill national security needs, countries seek capable suppliers of 
defense articles and services. If a customer country considers the USG a viable supplier 
of defense articles or services, the FMS process begins. According to DISAM (2015), 
during this stage, “ongoing consultations between the customer country and the U.S. 
representatives” occurs (p. 5-2). The SA organization in Turkey is the Office of Defense 
Cooperation (ODC)-Turkey. ODC-Turkey plans and executes SA in Turkey, “advising 
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about modernization, and assisting the U.S. defense contractors working with the Turkish 
Armed forces” (Robey & Vordermark, 2003-2004, p. 17).  
The following subtopics explain FMS stages from beginning to end. Figure 1 
illustrates the flow of the stages of the FMS process. 
Figure 1.  Flow of the Stages of the FMS Process  
 
 
a. Letter of Request 
The Letter of Request (LOR) is the first activity in the FMS process. After the 
customer country becomes interested in buying U.S. defense articles or services, it may 
prepare and submit an LOR to the USG. There is no standard format for the LOR, but it 
is best to sufficiently itemize the customer’s requirements. A purchaser may ask only for 
information relating to Price and Availability (P&A) Data. Alternatively, a purchaser 
may request a formal agreement for sales, known as Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(LOA). An LOR should be addressed to DSCA and to the implementing agency (IA), a 









implements and handles thousands of cases for its SA headquarters, the Navy’s 
International Program Office (Navy IPO). Additionally, copies of an LOR, as outlined by 
DISAM (2015), should be addressed to some key organizations such as the U.S. embassy 
or DSCA. 
b. Responses to an LOR 
There are three possible responses from the USG to the customer country: P&A 
Data, an LOA, or a negative response to the request. 
(1) P&A Data 
Customers can ask for P&A data from the U.S. government. According to 
DISAM (2015) P&A data is ‘“a rough order of magnitude estimate reflecting projected 
cost and availability for defense articles and services identified in an LOR” (p. 5-3). 
However, it is unacceptable for use in either LOA preparation or a customer country’s 
budgeting activities because it is not an official offer from the USG. The only purpose of 
this data is to provide information for planning activities. Unless DSCA approves, 
nonstandard requests are excluded from the response. There is no obligation for the 
purchaser to buy articles or services after requesting P&A data. As DISAM (2015) 
described, if the customer country decides to purchase U.S. defense articles and services 
after examining P&A data, it must submit another LOR for an LOA (p. 5-3). 
(2) Reviewing Process and the LOA 
Depending on the defense articles and services requested, the USG’s reviews’ 
time and extent differs. The IA ensures that the LOR is reviewed by the correct 
organizations. “To minimize the response time to the customer … all required reviews 
occur concurrently” if possible (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-8). Within five days after receipt, the 
IA validates the LOR by checking the eligibility of the purchasing country and the items 
requested the suitability of the request processing channels, as well as existing sanctions 
and the country’s overall dependability. A Dependable Undertaking, as DISAM defined, 
occurs when the purchasing government “agrees to pay the full amount of such contract 
which will assure the USG against any loss; to make funds available in such amounts and 
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at such times as may be required by the contract (and to cover any damages/termination 
costs)” (p. 2-16).  
Within 10 days after the IA receives the LOR, the IA initiates case development 
and compiles the LOA data (LOAD) from related organizations. During LOA 
preparation, the LOAD is applied. One of the major characteristics of the FMS program 
is its Total Package Approach (TPA) in which all necessary follow-on support materiel 
and services for fielding and utilizing the system are provided. This materiel includes at 
least one-year supply of spare parts. The TPA is considered during the LOAD estimation 
process (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-7). 
FMS policy gives the IA between 45 and 150 days after the receipt of the LOR to 
prepare an LOA offer. This policy timeframe, called an Anticipated Offer Date, is 
designated according to the assigned group category under which proposed articles or 
services fall. These group categories are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Anticipated Offer Date Groups—A Letter of Request to a 
Letter of Offer and the Acceptance Response Time  
Group Description 
A 45 days for Blanket Order LOAs, training LOAs, Cooperative Supply Support Arrangements 
(CLSSAs), and associated Amendments and Modifications. The IA can change the date to less than 
45 calendar days if appropriate. 
B 100 days for Defined Order LOAs and associated Amendments and Modifications. The IA can 
change the date to less than 100 calendar days if appropriate. 
C 150 days for Defined Order LOAs and associated amendments that are considered “purchaser-
unique” in nature. The IA can change the date to less than 150 calendar days if appropriate. 
Associated Modifications to this group will be placed in Group B. 
The IA must identify why the LOA document is “purchaser unique” by selecting one of the below 8 
factors: 1. First-time purchase of a defense article or service by an FMS purchaser 2. First-time FMS 
purchase by a specific country or international organization with limited experience or knowledge of 
FMS processes/procedures 3. Case requires engineering, system integration, or special acquisition 4. 
Requested use of the system is different from its use by U.S. military forces (e.g., Navy ship missile 
to be fired from an Army or foreign country’s helicopter) 5. Detailed release/disclosure coordination 
required 6. Complex pricing effort required 7. Extraordinary coordination required inside or outside 
the IAs 8. Other (must be explained by detailed milestone comments in DSAMS) 
Adapted from: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2015). The 
management of security cooperation (Green book) (34.1 ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, 
OH. Retrieved from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/greenbook.aspx 
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When the IA’s LOR price estimation meets or exceeds certain dollar thresholds, the 
IA provides Congressional notification data to DSCA within ten days of LOR receipt. DSCA 
prepares the notification. These financial thresholds and review periods vary by country, as 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Foreign Military Sales Notification to Congress 
NATO Countries, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, Israel, and Republic of Korea 
All Other Countries 
Reporting Threshold 
• $100M total case value 
• $25M major defense equipment (MDE) 
• $300M design and construction services 
• $50M total case value 
• $14M major defense equipment (MDE) 
• $200M design and construction services 
Congressional Review Period 
15 days statutory (formal) notification 30 days statutory (formal) notification 
Source: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2015). The management 
of security cooperation (Green book) (34.1 ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Retrieved 
from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/greenbook.aspx 
It is very important for all stakeholders to take U.S. Congress’ calendar into 
consideration since it affects plans for key FMS program milestones. Furthermore, 
DISAM (2015) described, “Congress must be at session at the start of the statutory 
notification period”; it is possible that the proposed LOA may be rejected by Congress if 
it “pass[es] a joint resolution” (p. 5-10). Details about congressional notification activities 
and processes were explained by DISAM (2015) in the Management of Security 
Cooperation, Chapter 5, page 9. 
(3) Negative Responses to Letters of Request 
Before the formal notification of rejection to the customer, the IA first contacts 
DSCA about its decision. Then, DSCA coordinates with all related organizations 
including the Department of State (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-7). Chapter 2.2 of the Security 
Assistance Management Manual covers the negative response protocol (DSCA, 2003). 
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c. Contractual Agreement: The Letter of Acceptance 
According to DSCA (2003), “The LOA is the document used by the USG to sell 
defense articles, defense services (to include training), and design and construction 
services to a foreign country or international organization under authorities granted in the 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA)” (p. 123). An LOA, the document used for all security 
assistance programs, is also called an FMS case (DISAM, 2015, p. 6-1). . According to 
DISAM (2015), special types of LOA, such as the pseudo LOA and Building Partner 
Capacity LOA’s, exists in addition to the standard LOA. DISAM (2015) explains that 
“Under traditional FMS, an LOA is a bilateral agreement between the U.S. government 
(USG) and an authorized foreign purchaser. In the LOA, the USG commits itself to 
provide certain defense items or services and the purchaser commits to abide by specific 
terms and conditions associated with the sale and to make specified financial payments” 
(DISAM, 2015, hapter 8, p.1).  
In The Management of Security Assistance document, DISAM (2015) indicated 
that “IA must offer an LOA within thirty to ninety days after receipt of an LOR, 
depending on the type and complexity of the case” (p. 5-3). Unlike the P&A and LOAD 
price estimates, the prices in the LOA are the “most precise data available at the time the 
document is prepared” (p. 5-4). The clearer and more comprehensive a customer’s 
information is in its LOR, the more accurate and complete the pricing and delivery 
schedules will be in the LOA (DISAM, 2015). In the LOA Standard Terms and 
Conditions in the , DSCA (2003) stated that “The USG shall use its best efforts to deliver 
at the estimated price, but that the purchaser is obligated to reimburse the USG for the 
total cost if it is greater than that price” (p. 458). Further DISAM stated that “The USG 
will use its best efforts to provide the items for the dollar amount and within the 
availability cited in AECA Sales Agreement Requirements” (p. 8-4). Under FMS, most 
USG actions are conducted with “best effort.” After several reviews by the Department of 
State (DOS) and DSCA’s Case Writing Division at its headquarters— in consideration of 
policy, legal, and financial aspects—an LOA is offered to the customer country with all 
authorized signatures for acceptance. Every LOA has an offer expiration date. This 
expiration date is generally eighty-five days from the IA approval, according to DISAM 
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(2015), a total of “twenty-five days for U.S. administration process and sixty days for 
country review” (p. 5-13). This LOA references the LOR and is a formal sales offer from 
the USG. 
Every customer country has its own structure and process for review and 
acceptance. When the customer country accepts and counter-signs the proposed LOA as 
well as forwards the initial deposit specified therein, the LOA becomes a formal 
government-to-government agreement (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-13). During the reviews, both 
parties must comply with their respective laws and policies (DISAM, 2015). Also, the 
LOA must be signed by an authorized representative of the customer. The customer 
country completes necessary purchaser provided information, signs the case before the 
expiration time arrives, and sends the proper amount of signed copies to the IA and the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS-SCA). Additionally, the customer 
country sends the initial deposit in U.S. dollars via check or wire transfer, as reflected in 
the LOA. Without the initial deposit, which is a condition of acceptance, the USG will 
not implement the agreement. Since the cost and schedule in the LOA are perishable, it is 
important for the customer country to accept the offer before its expiration (DISAM, 
2015, p. 5-13). 
The content for every LOA that originates from FMS has a standard set of terms 
and conditions (T&Cs). DSCA keeps the T&Cs in up-to-date compliance with the most 
current policies and legislature. Like everything written in the LOA, the T&Cs are 
applicable throughout the life of the contract (DISAM, 2015). Some of these T&Cs are 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
All items in FMS, will be the standard items that the DOD currently uses, without 
regard to make or model. This is important because the DOD uses the exact same 
acquisition and procurement processes and procedures for each FMS case. (DISAM, 
2015) This means that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense 
Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS) clauses apply to FMS. In other words, 
FMS customers enjoy the same benefits and protection under these legislations while 
getting the items in the most cost and schedule effective way through competition 
(DSCA, 2003, Chapter 4). This is why most countries choose FMS. However, the FMS 
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process also has its shortfalls, especially when the third-party beneficiary concept is 
considered. When defense materiel is procured for commercial vendors, the FMS process 
has two different contractual agreements: the contractual agreement between the USG 
and the U.S. commercial vendors as well as the contractual agreement between the USG 
and the purchasing country in the form of an LOA. Even though both contracts are signed 
by U.S. contracting officers, they are governed by different regulations. The procurement 
contract is governed by the FAR while the LOA is governed by DSCA’s (2003) Security 
Assistance Management Manual. These differences create shortfalls in cases of disputes 
and obstruct pursuing third-party beneficiary rights. This is because the FAR has the full 
“force and effect” of the law while LOA is an international agreement based on a DOD 
manual (DISAM, 2015, p. 9-4). As shown in the Trimble Cases, United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defense v. Trimble Navigation Ltd. (2005) and Secretary of State for Defense 
v. Trimble Navigation Ltd. (2007), FMS purchasers have a disadvantage in pursuing 
judicial solutions for disputes because the USG, not the customer, is the legal beneficiary 
of the FMS procurement, according to the FAR.  
Customer involvement in the FMS procurement process is defined in the DFARS 
(2005) as a request for a sole-source to participate “in discussions with the industry to 
develop technical specifications; to establish a delivery schedules; to identify any 
warranty provisions…; [as well as reviews for] price-performance trade-offs … [without 
being informed of] any data, including certified cost or pricing” (48 CFR 225.7304). 
Nevertheless, the contracting officer determines the role of the customer after 
consultation with the contractor. Other than the aforementioned involvement, FMS 
customers cannot exclude firms from the solicitation process, interfere with subcontracts, 
observe or participate in negotiations between the USG and contractors, give direction 
about contract terms or source-selection decisions, reject any bid or proposal. According 
to DFARS (2015), USG’s policy is not meant to encourage or commit U.S. firms to FMS 
offset arrangements, this is up to yet those firms can do as they wish. 
The DOD gets the same warranties for FMS customers as it does internally except 
from when requested with timely notice. According to DISAM (2015), these warranties 
are used as input to the SDR process and reflected in the cost of the contract (p. 8-16). 
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Offset costs are also reflected in the total price and credited to the customers FMS funds 
(DISAM, 2015, p. 20-21). 
The USG may attach anti-tamper protection to defense articles sold under FMS to 
safeguard critical technology. This anti-tamper protection does not alter the form, fit, or 
function of an article (DISAM, 2015, p. 8-5). 
In an LOA, the term “best effort” is cited in many terms and clauses even for the 
USG obligation for the cost and delivery schedule. DISAM (2015) defined this legal term 
as  
that [which] implies a party’s good faith or intent to achieve a stated future 
outcome; however, this term also recognizes the potential for other factors to 
subsequently arise that could preclude the offer from actually attaining the 
intended goal…Therefore, a party performing under a “best effort” condition 
will not be considered in default of the contract if the intended performance 
outcomes are not achieved….In regard to the LOA, this section means that 
the USG will undertake the execution of each LOA with the intent to deliver 
within the estimated cost and delivery dates cited in the LOA but the USG 
cannot promise or guarantee these estimates will be achieved. As such, the 
purchaser understands and accepts the risk that the USG may fail to meet the 
LOA cost and delivery estimates. (p. 8-5) 
 
Another important point in the LOA is the cancellation right of the USG. DSCA 
(2003) described this right of cancellation: “The USG reserves the right to cancel it in whole 
or in part when determined to be in the USG’s best interest” (p. 132). Moreover, there must 
be a significant event to “change USG position or decide to cancel” the agreement. In the 
case of cancellation, the USG assumes responsibility of related costs (DSCA, 2003, p. 132).  
d. Implementation and Execution 
Once the USG receives the initial deposit from the customer country, the acting 
IA receives obligational authority (OA), which means there is evidence for case 
acceptance resulting in the financial authority of IA case managers. Even though there is 
no standard timeframe for case implementation, it generally occurs within ten to fifteen 
days. A case manager may issue a case directive—a project directive for the U.S. Navy—
which is a document or documents that include logistical and financial implementation 
instructions. When the customer country processes orders against the case, the 
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implementation phase ends and the execution phase begins (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-14). 
During the execution phase of the case, many acquisition, finance, logistics, and training 
activities happen, depending on the case type and content. FMS cases tend to create 
thousands of logistical and financial transactions that require data systems for internal 
control and management. These systems oversee the performance of the cases while 
reporting the case status to the customer and DFAS-SCA (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-15). 
According to DSCA (2003), case execution must be in compliance with DOD regulations 
and procedures. In addition to procurement and acquisition activities, the DOD carries 
out supply and logistics actions in the same manner that it does internally. 
e. Reconciliation and Closure 
A successful case closure requires thorough and continuous reconciliation. As 
mentioned before, a single FMS case can generate thousands of transactions that require 
aggressive planning and continuous follow-up in order to close them all (DISAM, 2015). 
Reconciliation, which takes place at least annually, ensures the following: proper 
accounting of financial and logistical actions, accuracy and thoroughness of data, current 
schedules, as well as timeliness and completeness of reporting. 
According to DISAM (2015), a case can be considered for closure when it is 
“Supply and Services Complete” and after the following criteria: “[a]ll materiel has been 
delivered; [a]ll services have been performed; [f]or a blanket order case, no orders have 
been placed against it for 180 days or more; [t]he purchaser has confirmed that there will 
be no new orders, [t]he purchaser has not submitted a request to keep the case open; [a]ll 
supply discrepancy reports (SDRs) have been resolved, [a]ll warranty periods have 
elapsed” (p. 5-18). 
In order to reduce the administrative burden and to release excess funds back to 
the customer country, DSCA closes cases as soon as possible. When DFAS completes the 
case reconciliation and closure process, it provides a final bill to the customer. According 
to DISAM (2015), “an FMS case is considered closed when the purchaser receives the 
final bill or a final statement of the account” (p. 5-19). 
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There are two types of case closure: the Accelerated Case Closure Procedure 
(ACCP) or the non-ACCP. Under the ACCP, cases are closed within twenty-four months 
from SSC, according to DISAM (2015), “even if there are outstanding unliquidated 
obligations against the case” (p. 5-19). Inventory requisition is one kind of obligation 
(DISAM, 2015, p. 5-19). The case is considered interim closed when the outstanding 
unliquidated obligation (ULO) value, that is, “the difference between the estimated final 
case obligations and the current cumulative case expenditures … is billed and collected 
from the customer country and placed into a customer-owned, country level Case Closure 
Suspense Account” (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-20). A Case Closure Suspense Account ensures 
that a case remains closed even when there are subsequent disbursements. A case is 
considered final closed when all ULOs are equal to final disbursements. The customer 
country receives a reimbursement if there are excess ULOs in the final closure (DISAM, 
2015, p. 5-20). Although the ACCP is a voluntary procedure, DSCA (2003) indicated that 
it is mandatory for countries whose programs are financed by the FMFP (p. 254). Today, 
the ACCP is considered a standard method because most countries use it. According to 
DSCA (2003), Turkey is considered an ACCP-eligible country (pp. 87-93).  
Customer countries that finance FMS programs wholly with their own national 
funds, as well as those who are ineligible to use the ACCP use the non-ACCP. In order 
for non-ACCP cases to be closed there should not be any “unliquidated obligations 
(ULOs) against the underlying open contracts. If no contracts apply, then the estimated 
closure date is normally thirty-six months from the last scheduled delivery or service” 
(DISAM, p. 5-19). This process is burdensome and time ineffective; therefore, most 
customers are in ACCP (DISAM, 2015, p. 5-19).Although non-ACCP cases can be 
reopened after final closer if the final audit finds a lost expenditure, according to DISAM 
(2015), ACCP cases stay closed since newly discovered expenses can be reimbursed to 
the CCSA (p. 5-20). 
f. Summary 
From the requirement determination to final case closure, the FMS process 
requires a significant amount of activities that require significant effort. Even though it 
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may seem complicated, the FMS process comprises well-structured, well-documented 
procedures and a logical timeline. Table 3 summarizes the whole process. 




Indefinite Time Period 
Customer identifies defense capabilities 
Customer researches options/sources 
Customer refines requirements 
Customer and U.S. exchange technical information
Request 
Indefinite Time Period 
Customer prepares Letter of Request (LOR)
Price and Availability (P&A) or LOA 
Country Team Assessment (CTA) 
LOR channels of submission 




45-150 days  
Anticipated Offer Date depends on type 
and complexity of case; Formal 
Congressional review is 15-30 days 
IA and DSCA receive and evaluate LOR 
IA develops LOA data (LOAD) 
DSCA Case Writing Division finalizes LOA 
Congressional notification, if required, is 
concurrent with LOA development 
DSCA-CWD countersigns LOA 
IA issues LOA to customer 
Acceptance 
OED is generally 85 days from IA 
approval in DSAMS 
(includes 60 days for country review) 
Customer signs LOA by Offer Expiration Date
Customer sends signed LOA to the IA 
Customer sends signed LOA and Initial Deposit to 






10-15 days average 
DFAS issues Obligational Authority (OA) 
IA issues implementing directive  
IA activates FMS computer systems 
Execution 
Longest phase; depends on delivery 
schedule 
Articles/services/training are ordered/contracted
Articles shipped and services performed 
Training conducted 
IA reports performance to customer/DFAS-SCA
Closure 
2 years from supply/services complete 
(Accelerated Case Closure Procedures)
IA/DFAS/customer reconcile records 
IA sends closure certificate to DFAS-SCA 
DFAS-SCA issues final bill to customer 
Source: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2015). The management 
of security cooperation (Green book) (34.1 ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Retrieved 
from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/greenbook.aspx 
3. FMS Case Types 
It is crucial to understand the FMS case concept in order to comprehend the 
overall program. DSCA (2003) defines three types of LOAs: the Defined Order LOAs, 
Blanket Order LOAs, and Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA).  
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a. Defined Order Case 
The term Defined Order Case is used to identify cases in which items or services 
are explicitly and clearly stated. These cases are generally used for major end items that 
require item-by-item export and trade security control (DSCA, 2003, p. 124). Items 
provided under this case type comprise significant military equipment (SME); major 
defense equipment (MDE), which includes (major end items such as tanks, ships, 
airplanes, and missiles; and related support for a TPA, explosives, technical data 
packages, specific services, as well as classified or sensitive materiel(DISAM, 2015, p. 6-
2). Except for in TPA support packages, relatively minor, non-SME, or other items that 
do not require rigorous trade and export controls cannot be provided under this type of 
LOA (DISAM, 2015, p. 6-2). 
b. Blanket Order Case 
Blanket order cases are used to provide category of items or services without a 
definitive list of exact item descriptions or quantities. In this type of case, according to 
DISAM (2015), purchasers set a maximum dollar value and can submit requisitions until 
funds are depleted (p. 6-2). This feature provides more flexibility but also transfers the 
responsibility for preparing and submitting requisitions to the purchaser. This responsibility 
requires the purchaser to be familiar with the requisition procedures and supply system of the 
United States. A blanket order case is also time effective because it eliminates the need for 
extensive estimations, conducted requirement under defined order cases. 
According to DISAM (2015), the materiel that can be provided under blanket orders 
include but are not limited to spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications, 
maintenance, repairables, technical assistance, training, and training aids (p. 6-2). Examples 
of materiel that cannot be provided under blanket orders include SME, MDE, initial 
logistics support for end items TPA; classified materiel; commercial-type materiel, 
including household goods, and sand, lumber, etc.; technical data packages; ozone 
depleting substances; and explosives including munitions (p. 6-3). 
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c. Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements 
DSCA (2003) described a CLSSA as follows: it “provide[s] for pre-stockage and 
storage of DOD-stocked non-SME items that are needed and used by the FMS purchaser 
on a recurring basis” (p. 125). There are two separate LOAs under CLSSA: an FMS 
Order (FMSO) I case and an FMSO II case. An FMSO I is established up front for the 
purchase and sustainment of needed items in the DOD supply system. An FMSO II is a 
blanket order for requisitioning those items (DSCA, 2003, p. 125). When the estimation 
of the item quantities equals a supply for five months on hand and 12 months on order, 
the DOD procures necessary augmentation stocks using the investment in FMSO I case 
to be ready to purchaser withdrawal (DSCA, 2003, p. 232). If the stock levels go down 
because of the FMSO II requisitioning, DOD components replenishes the stocks by using 
the funds in FMSO I case. If the IA anticipates that the purchaser the possibility of excess 
materiel emerges after the review of the demand quantities and stocks, IA contacts with 
the purchaser about the disposition options. The excess materiel can either be sent to the 
purchaser or disposed; however, the disposal cost is the purchaser’s responsibility 
(DSCA, 2003, p. 233). 
This more responsive case type offers more efficient means of supply support 
thanks to its equity investment in U.S. stocks. This equity investment is based on 
previously conducted materiel-need estimations and considerations of financial 
investment in advance (DISAM, 2015, p. 10-22). Besides its possible effectiveness, a 
CLSSA creates a financial burden and uncertainty for the purchasers because it requires 
an up-front investment from the purchaser, which bears the risk of excess inventory.  
4. Overview of the Organization of the U.S. Navy for FMS 
The Naval Supply Systems Command’s (NAVSUP’s; 2011) fifth edition of the 
Foreign Military Sales Purchaser Supply System Guide serves as the primary source of 
information for FMS customer countries’ navies regarding the U.S. Navy’s structure for 
the FMS program. NAVSUP (2011) illustrated the U.S. supply systems with sufficient 
information and guidelines. Figure 2 shows the chain of command for the U.S. Navy 
Supply System, which uses the same structure to provide support for both U.S. elements 
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and FMS customers. Thus, it is very important to understand this structure for assessing 
the effectiveness of the FMS process handled by the U.S. Navy as an IA. The following 
subtopics cover basic elements of this system and their function in the FMS process. 
Figure 2.  U.S. Navy Supply System 
 
Source: Naval Supply Systems Command. (2011, August). Foreign military sales 





NAVSUP (2011) described the U.S. supply system as the collection of all 
“activities that identify materiel requirements and that procure, store, and distribute 
materiel to support its military purchasers” (p. 1-2). These military purchasers include the 
U.S. Navy’s fleets, the U.S. Navy’s shore activities, other U.S. armed forces, and FMS 
purchasers. According to NAVSUP (2011), there are three management levels in this 
system: the policy level, the inventory management level, and the materiel distribution 
level (p. 1-2). Figure 2 demonstrates the system. The following paragraphs briefly discuss 
some of the organizations and their roles. 
The U.S. Navy’s source for overall guidance and direction is the Secretary of the Navy. 
The organization that handles LOAs for FMS customer countries is the Navy 
International Programs Office (Navy IPO), which is under the Office of the Secretary of 
the Navy (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-2). The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) establishes 
general policy guidelines about supply support to purchasers (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-2). 
Under the CNO, there are five systems commands, according to NAVSUP (2011) that are 
responsible for procuring, stocking and supporting certain types of materiel via their 
separate organizations: the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the Naval Sea 
Systems Command, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command, and the Naval Supply System Command (p. 1-3). 
According to NAVSUP (2011), the Supply Systems Command “has the primary 
responsibility for running U.S. supply system …[and] develops and implements supply 
policies and procedures … [which] are designed to meet CNO requirements and 
objectives” (p. 1-3). 
At the heart of supply operations, Navy inventory managers (NIMs) identify 
needs as well as procure items and distribute them to the stock points (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 
1-3). NAVSUP (2011) described the NIMs’ mission as “hav[ing] the right item and the 
right quantity of that item available when and where a supply system purchaser needs it” 
(p. 1-3). Three categories of NIMs are shown in Figure 3. The first group, over the five 
systems commands, manages major equipment components while the second group, 
Navy Supply and Weapon System Support (NAVSUP-WSS), manages, according to 
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NAVSUP (2011) “repairable items, repair parts, publications, and other consumable 
materiel used primarily by the U.S. Navy” (p. 1-3) The third group also includes 
inventory managers for various materiel (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-3). 
Figure 3.  Inventory Managers in the U.S. Supply System 
 
Source: Naval Supply Systems Command. (2011, August). Foreign military sales 




Defense depot points reside in the materiel distribution level and receive, store, 
and issue materiel as well as arrange the transportation to the purchasers. These activities 
are part of the Defense Logistics Agency (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-4). Fleet and Industrial 
Supply Centers also handle many FMS activities including the following:  
ship husbanding and chandler services for visiting FMS purchaser naval vessels, 
… provision of waterfront supplies and services, … support of the transfer of a 
U.S. ship to an FMS purchaser’s navy[,] including supply assistance and training 
in the management of the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List spare parts, 
[and] provision of training to FMS purchaser vessel crew members in the area of 
material processing. (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-4) 
b. Organizations with Major FMS Roles 
There are four major organizations that have important roles in the FMS program. 
These organizations comprise the Navy IPO, the NAVSUP-WSS, the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Financial Management and Comptroller (ASN-FM&C), and the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service-Indianapolis (DFAS-JAXBF/IN) (NAVSUP, 2011).  
(1) NAVY IPO 
As mentioned before, NAVSUP (2011) referred to the Navy IPO as the main 
organization for the U.S. Navy’s FMS program with “overall direction, guidance, 
and control” (p. 1-4). Additionally, the Navy IPO formulates procedures between 
other services over logistics support of naval weapons systems and equipment 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-4). 
(2) NAVSUP-WSS 
NAVSUP-WSS is one of the key players in the U.S. Navy’s FMS administration 
and management. According to NAVSUP (2011), NAVSUP-WSS’s functions include 
but are not limited to developing the policies and procedures for the U.S. Navy’s security 
assistance (SA); preparing, administering, managing, and monitoring DRP, ROR, and 
CLSSA cases and related supply actions; serving as the U.S. Navy’s focal point for FMS, 
introducing all FMS transactions to the U.S. supply system, and conducting review 
meetings (p. 1-5). 
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(3) ASN-FMC 
U.S. Navy-sponsored cases are financially managed by the ASN-FMC along with 
DFAS-JAXBF/IN. This activity, according to NAVSUP (2011), includes “control and 
issuance of obligation authority via Defense Security Assistance Management System 
(DSAMS) … [as well as] policy and procedural guidance to the U.S. Navy activities 
involved” (p. 1-5). In addition, ASN-FMC “has delegated the day-to-day operational 
fiduciary responsibility to the Navy IPO” (p. 1-5). 
(4) DFAS-JAXBF/IN 
NAVSUP (2011) described DFAS-JAXBF/IN as a point of contact for FMS 
customers regarding financial issues that provide “accounting and financial functions on 
all U.S. Navy FMS program” (p. 1-6). These functions include “performing financial 
monitoring operations, providing financial status, providing financial accounting 
throughout the life of the FMS case, executing billing and collection procedures, and case 
reconciliation and closure” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 1-6). 
c. FMS Requisitioning in the U.S. Supply System  
The U.S. Navy FMS process begins with the purchaser’s submission of an LOR 
to the Navy IPO. All requisitions for the items or services set in LOAs are sent to 
NAVSUP-WSS. All FMS transactions use Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue 
Procedures (MILSTRIP) documents, the standard way to order materiel within the DOD. 
These documents are the main tools for requisitions, status checks, and follow-on action 
in the supply system. Requisitioning documents are used for orders, status documents are 
used for tracking actions against orders, and the follow-on documents are used for finding 
the current status of orders. MILSTRIP documents are used for one item only without 
any quantity restrictions. They define the kind of item or service with a unique document 
number that is trackable throughout the life cycle of the transaction (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 
2-1). As shown in Figure 4, there are several ways to start a requisition. 
From the supply point of view, there are two types of requisitioning: push and pull cases. 
When a purchaser identifies the requirements and makes an order, the requisition is called 
a pull since the purchaser pulls the materiel from the U.S. supplies. On the other hand, 
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when the U.S. supply system prepares the requisition and sends it to the purchaser, it is 
called a push requisition. Stock replenishment for spare parts is an example of a pull. An 
initial stock requisition, which is sent to a purchaser as a result of TPA is an example of a 
push since it is prepared by U.S. item managers. Push requisitions cannot be used for 
services; services can only be asked for as part of an LOA (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 2-1). 
Specialized requisitioning, such as that of DRP and RoR, is discussed in detail in the 
following paragraphs.  
Figure 4.  FMS Requisitioning in the U.S. Navy 
 
Source: Naval Supply Systems Command. (2011, August). Foreign military sales 




Another mandatory application for FMS transactions is the priority code. The 
Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) is used by all DOD 
components to ensure that urgent needs are taken care with priority. This priority system 
can be applied to requisitioning, issuing, handling, and transporting of an item 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 2-2). For details on how the UMMIPS operates, please see Chapter 8 
of DOD 4140.1-R, the Supply Chain Management Regulation and the Instruction 4614.1 
from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In brief, the lower the priority number 
is, the more urgent the need. There are three different priority codes in use: 03-Extremely 
Urgent (critical), 06-Urgent (not Critical), and 15-Routine. According to NAVSUP 
(2011), if the purchaser wants “material to be delivered prior to, or later than, the time 
specified by the UMMIPS priority designator, [it] … should enter the desired delivery 
date” (p. 2-11). 
There are different means for submitting a requisition: electronic sources, fax, and 
mail. After necessary reviews and actions, all submissions are recorded in the 
Management Information System for International Logistics (MISIL). According to 
NAVSUP (2011), “MISIL is the U.S. Navy’s primary system for processing, controlling, 
tracking, and reporting Navy FMS transactions” (p. 2-5). All requests are sent to the 
related item managers, who obtain the materiel from stock or via procurement. Then, they 
ensure the shipment to the customer (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 2-5).  
After submitting the requisition, the purchaser cannot increase the quantity. If the 
quantity ordered is incorrect or insufficient to satisfy the needs of the purchaser, a new 
requisition must be submitted under a new document number (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 2-20). 
Because of changing needs, sometimes purchasers ask for cancellations of either the 
entire quantity ordered or part of it. If the USG can honor this request, it incurs the costs 
related to the activities that have already occurred. This cost can be part or full of the cost 
of the requisition. It is not always possible for the USG to honor a cancellation if the 
materiel has already shipped. Other than a quantity change or cancellation, the purchaser 
may also request to change the delivery date or priority. The USG may take action 
depending on the availability of the materiel (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 2-21). The priority code 
may be changed in cases of emergency in which the purchaser requires an immediate 
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remedy. These emergencies must be either operational inability or work stoppage for the 
purchaser in crucial support or production activities due to a lack of materiel. The priority 
change will only be enforced for the quantity of the materiel that will resolve the situation 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 2-22).  
As mentioned earlier, USG activities and commercial vendors are two sources of 
supplies for FMS. Materiel is shipped from these points to FMS customers. The shipment 
occurs at no cost to the purchaser when the delivery point is in the Continental United 
States (CONUS), so most FMS customers use a CONUS delivery point and a commercial 
freight forwarding service provider as their representative and shipment delivery point in 
CONUS. After the materiel reaches the freight forwarder (FF), it is transported to the end 
destination via transportation arranged by FF. According to standard T&C in the LOA, 
title (the ownership) of the materiel passes from the USG to the purchaser at the source of 
supply. This happens regardless of how the materiel is transported unless it is specifically 
stated in the LOA. Government-furnished or critical materiel, such as ammunition and 
classified ones are an exception and always transported via USG capabilities or prepaid 
government bills of lading. These kinds of exceptions and their costs are stated in the 
LOA (NAVSUP, 2011, p.2-16).In Chapter 2 of NAVSUP’s (2011) Foreign Military 
Sales Purchaser Supply System Guide, all requisition activities are discussed in greater 
detail. Figure 3 outlines the requisition flow in the U.S. Navy’s FMS process. 
E. FMS DIRECT REQUISITIONING PROCEDURES 
One of the main purposes of this research is to analyze the Turkish Navy (TN)’s 
records for direct requisitioning procedures (DRPs). Therefore, it is crucial to understand 
all DRPs handled by the U.S. Navy. In the following subparts, these special 
requisitioning procedures are discussed in detail.  
1. Overview 
NAVSUP (2011) described DRPs as “designed to simplify supply action on 
certain categories of items for which the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchaser will 
have a recurring need, such as unclassified spare parts, repair parts, minor components, 
training films, and publications” (p. 3-1). A DRP is a specific pull requisitioning 
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procedure, which is established as a blanket order case. Like other FMS cases, this 
process also starts with a request submission of an LOR for a blanket order to the Navy 
IPO. Every DRP case has a separate LOA that indicates no specific materiel. Since DRP 
cases are blanket order cases, they have only dollar limits for specific categories of 
materiel stated in the LOA. These categories may range from support items for weapons 
systems to publications (NAVSUP, 2011, 3-1). 
2. Requisitioning under DRP Cases 
DRPs are introduced by the U.S. Navy to increase overall effectiveness of FMS in 
cost and schedules for specific categories of materiel. By eliminating the need for 
preparing separate LOAs for each item every time, the requisitioning process becomes 
simplified with a decreased number of administrative activities. Thus, supply actions 
become more economic and easy to handle while increasing customer satisfaction. An 
LOA for DRPs free the purchaser from the limitations of defined order cases and give the 
purchaser the authority to request whatever materiel it needs and whenever materiel it 
needs under certain categories within specific dollar limits. 
The purchaser must follow the MILSTRIP rules, codes, and forms to make a 
requisitioning request against the DRP case. Requests should be transmitted 
electronically to the U.S. Navy, as stated by NAVSUP (2011) in Chapter 2. Electronic 
transmission is important because it “minimizes processing costs, reduces administrative 
delays, and improves delivery lead times” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 3-2).  
Requisitioning can continue until the funds in the case are depleted. Since DRPs 
are used for recurring needs, it is best to immediately replace depleted cases with new 
ones, so supply support will not be interrupted.  
3. Purchasing for DRP 
The FMS system categorizes items into two groups: standard and non-standard 
items. A standard item is an item that has a National Stock Number (NSN) and is 
currently in use within the U.S. supplies system. A non-standard item “is an item that 
either is not assigned a stock number, or is identified by an obsolete stock number that 
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has not been replaced” (p. 3-4). Since standard items are stocked in the U.S. supply 
system for the use of the U.S. military, a DRP requisition may be satisfied, according to 
NAVSUP (2011), from stocks only if “it does not interfere with the support of current 
and anticipated USG requirements” (p. 3-3). Otherwise, the U.S. inventory control point 
(ICP) conducts a procurement to obtain needed items. Whereas a stocked item’s price is 
the most up-to-date price, the price of a procured item is the actual cost from 
procurement. In both cases, the USG adds applicable surcharges to the bill in addition to 
these prices. 
The Commercial Buying Service, part of the Parts and Repair Ordering System 
(PROS), is primarily used in the procurement of non-standard items. PROS is managed 
by the Air Force Security Assistance Center. PROS’s program can procure a “wide range 
of standard and nonstandard supply parts and repair services … [as well as] specialized 
engineering and technical services” (p. 3-4). The aim of the PROS program is to provide 
“last stop shopping” for the purchasers (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 3-4). Regardless of the 
purchase, all procurements are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 
Both standard and nonstandard items are purchased at a total cost that cannot 
exceed the requisition value by specific amounts, as shown in Table 4. The requisition 
value is the multiplication number of Unit of Issue ordered and the unit price. The unit 
price of the standard items is it price is the current standard price, whereas it is the 
estimated Unit Price on the requisition for nonstandard items. Purchase price is the 
multiplication of number of Units of Issue and the contractor’s price of that unit. This 
price increase may result from the contractor’s minimum order criteria (NAVSUP, 2011, 
p. 3-10). Abiding by these price increase criteria, an item manager can buy items at 
increased prices without informing the customer country. If it is necessary to exceed 
these limits, item managers must get authorization to exceed the limits from the purchaser 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 3-5). 
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Table 4.   Criteria for Referral of Price Increases to the Purchaser 
Requisition Value  Authorized Price Increase 
Less Than $ 2,499 100% or $2,000, whichever is greater 
$ 2,500-$ 4,999 100% or $3,000, whichever is greater 
$ 5,000-$ 9,999 75% or $5,000, whichever is greater 
$10,000-$14,999 50% or $7,500, whichever is greater 
$15,000 and above 20% or $8,000, whichever is greater 
Source: Naval Supply Systems Command. (2011, August). Foreign military sales 
purchaser supply system guide NAVSUP publication 526 (Change 5). Retrieved from: 
https://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/ourteam/navsupwss/prod_serv/international/
FINAL_P526.pdf 
The estimated price for nonstandard materiel can be reached through “either the 
price on the most recent invoice for the same item, or price information from another 
document” (p. 3-4-5). Under a FMS DRP requisition for nonstandard items, the purchaser 
enters the estimated cost by adding 30 percent to the last invoice price. The minimum 
price for nonstandard item requisitioning submissions is $160 to for covering material 
and cancellation cost. NAVSUP-WCC has the right to change the submitted price for 
nonstandard items to this minimum price upon submission unless it is done by the 
purchaser (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 3-5). 
4. Limitations on DRP 
There are three types of limitation for DRP requisitioning: dollar, time, and 
materiel categorical limitations.  
a. Dollar Limitations 
One of the critical characteristics of DRPs is the dollar limit of the cases. As it 
was mentioned before, the purchaser country can request requisitions against a case until 
it reaches the dollar limit. This dollar limit comes from the fund that is allocated to the 
case. Under obligational authority, the USG reserves 20 percent of this fund as a safety 
measure. The purpose of this measure is to ensure that the customer country does not 
breach the dollar limit. When available funds are depleted, the country’s manager 
transfers an appropriate portion of the reserved funds to the available account for 
additional requisition (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 3-6).  
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b. Time Limitations 
There is no general time limitation for requisitioning against the case. However, 
any specific time limitation can be added if it is requested in the LOR and stated in the 
LOA by purchaser. Nevertheless, NAVSUP-WCC does not provide the same protections 
for time limitations as it does for dollar limitations. If there are available funds in the 
case, NAVSUP-WCC does not automatically stop accepting requisitions against the case 
even though the time has expired. According to NAVSUP (2011), this is because 
NAVSUP-WCC wants to “enables the purchaser to make use of all available funds 
before case closure” (p. 3-6).  
There are two time considerations on the applications of DRPs. After 
implementation, according to NAVSUP (2011), if the case remains idle with no 
requisitions for 180 days without notification to the Navy IPO of a special situation, “the 
case will be considered for closure” p. 3-6). The purchaser may submit an amendment to 
increase the case value for new requisitions, but it is only accepted during the first year of 
the case. “When the authorized amendment period has passed, and case funds are nearly 
exhausted,” explained NAVSUP (2011), “the purchaser must submit a LOR for a follow-
on case with enough advance notice (normally 120 days) to be sure of continued DRP 
services” (p. 3-6). 
c. Materiel Limitations 
According to NAVSUP (2011), materiel that can be requested under FMS DRP 
include spare and repair parts, minor components, excess defense articles (EDAs), and 
publications (3-2). Examples of materiel that may not be requested under FMS DRP are: 
“classified materials and publications …, technical support services …, initial 
provisioning of spare and repair parts applicable to all end items, ammunition and 
explosive items …, weapons systems, major end items and major components …, 
technical data packages, ozone depleting substances” (p. 3-2-3). In addition to these, 
purchasers cannot return the repair parts to the United States for repair under this case 
type (NAVSUP, 2011, 3-3). 
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If the DRP requisitioning requests include any of the aforementioned restricted 
items, the USG will return the requests and direct the purchaser toward a defined order 
case (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 3-3). NAVSUP (2011) mentioned that NAVSUP-WSS may 
allow the purchasers to order restricted items (other than those aforementioned items) 
under a DRP if the purchaser “fill[s] the items list with a written request for [a] waiver, 
with sufficient justification, and a written waiver approval” (p. 3-7). NAVSUP-WCC 
may give an approval letter after reviewing the list. A prior-obtained written approval is 
required to submit the purchase order. Otherwise, the request will be rejected (NAVSUP, 
2011, p. 3-7). 
F. REPAIR OF REPAIRABLES 
One of the most commonly used features of the FMS program is the service of 
repairing unserviceable FMS materiel in U.S. repair facilities. Since another main 
purpose of this research is to analyze the Turkish Navy’s ROR records, FMS repair 
service procedures are studied in detail in this sub chapter.  
1. Overview 
FMS purchasers have extensive U.S. defense materiel in their inventories. During 
the life cycle of this materiel, failures may happen, rendering it partly or fully inoperable. 
To maintain operational readiness levels, countries may consider repairing this 
nonfunctional materiel instead of replacing them with new ones to save time and money. 
The repair capabilities of the purchasers vary depending on the life-cycle support 
strategies they prefer. Some may prefer to establish their own repair capabilities; 
however, it is unfeasible to establish repair capabilities for every item procured via FMS. 
Thus, they consider FMS repair procedures to get these items repaired. The U.S. Navy’s 
FMS program provides repair services to FMS purchasers for their unserviceable materiel 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-1).  
In addition to commercial repair service contracts, the U.S. Navy already has vast 
repair programs for its own materiel. These programs are at the depot level, operated by 
several U.S. Navy activities. The purchasers can use these capabilities by establishing an 
FMS case for the U.S. Navy’s repair services. Countries that do not have their own repair 
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capabilities can use this source as an opportunity to fix their repairable FMS items. 
Others can use this capability as a supplement to their own services. FMS repair orders 
are combined with U.S. Navy’s repair orders for efficiency and cost savings. The process 
initiation is same as for other FMS cases. To begin taking advantage of the U.S. Navy’s 
repair services, a purchaser must submit an LOR to the Navy IPO for repair services. It is 
possible to establish repair cases with or without defined materiel and quantity. For either 
type, a dollar amount, which cannot be exceeded, is required. All repair-related costs are 
reflected in the LOA. These billed costs include the actual cost of repair along with 
administrative and accessorial charges. According to NAVSUP (2011), ROR is a non-
standard process focused on “repair and return of the same serial numbered asset” (p. 5-
1). 
2. Procedures 
Electronic management programs, the Security Cooperation Information Portal 
and WebRoR, are used to process repair requisitions. WebRoR is a mandatory system for 
all ROR transactions and “emphasizes customer input and interaction with NAVSUP-
WSS Repair Managers … [and] provides FMS purchasers with the resources to submit, 
track, and maintain FMS repairable programs” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-2). WebRoR can be 
used by customers after etablishing an FMS repair case. Under the FMS repair case, only 
repair services can be requisitioned. ROR is applicable for those items that the U.S. Navy 
has repair capabilities. No materiel is allowed to be ordered under this type of case. 
Similarly, no repair services can be requisitioned under a DRP. A repair LOA can either 
contain broad wording for repair services or specific definitions of items to be repaired. 
Regardless of the content, a separate MILSTRIP document number is needed for each 
item. All of the items are turned over to the U.S. repair facilities for repair. During the 
return to the United States, all items are processed through U.S. customs. If used by the 
purchaser, freight forwarders (FFs), play a vital role for the success of RoR as they 
handle all shipments of items to and from the United States through the custom clearance 
process. Therefore, purchasers must be sure about whether their FFs use the correct 
processes and procedures during RoR actions. 
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a. Steps of ROR Procedures 
The following briefly explains the steps of ROR Procedures. 
(1) Request  
In order to make a request for repair services, an FMS repair case must be 
established by applying to the Navy IPO. After the case is established, the purchaser can 
ask for an estimated repair price by submitting a Request for Repair Service (RFRS) via 
WebRoR. All items’ NSN and manufacturer part numbers must be clearly stated. 
Supplying complete information about the item and failure details affects the success of 
these procedures. An applicable NAVSUP-WCC repair manager (RM) will receive this 
request and determine the right repair facility according to case and item type. Based on 
the last repair on file in the domestic U.S. supply system for the provided NSN and part 
number in RFRS, the RM estimates the repair cost and sends this estimation to the 
purchaser via WebRoR. Because of the nature of the estimation process and risk-averse 
approach of vendors, this price can be updated later (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-6).  
(2) Response 
The RM responds to a purchaser with a decision to approve or reject the request. 
In the case of a rejection, the RM indicates the reason. If the RM approves RFRS, the 
purchaser is notified via WebRoR. The purchaser can either accept or reject the updated 
price according to its price review. To be authorized to return the repairable to the U.S., 
the purchaser should accept the updated price. This is required to create WebRoR 
tracking record and important because of its effect on available balance maintained in 
WebRoR. Every RFRS is considered a purchaser’s commitment against its FMS case 
funds and is tracked financially by WebRoR. When the funds are depleted by the 
commitments, additional RFRS submissions are blocked. In the case of cancellations or 
rejections, all committed funds are returned to the purchaser’s balance in WebRoR 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-6).  
A purchaser must respond within 45 days of RFRS approval, after which 
WebRoR automatically rejects the request. If the service is still needed, a new RFRS 
must be submitted by the purchaser. After the acceptance of the updated cost, the 
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customer prepares the repairable materiel along with the required documents for return 
shipment. There is another time limitation for the returning of the materiel to the U.S. 
Within 90 days of RFRS approval, the U.S. repair facility assigned must receive the 
materiel from the customer. Otherwise, the RM will cancel the transaction (NAVSUP, 
2011, p. 5-7). 
(3) Packaging 
Packaging of the returned items should be in accordance with Military Standard 
794D, which specifies the correct reusable container for the item. After repair, the USG 
returns the newly repaired item in the same container. If there is a problem with the 
container, the USG will fix the container. If there is no container for the item, the USG 
will provide one. The purpose of these efforts is to send the item back to the customer 
with the best protection possible. All the costs related to containers will be reimbursed 
from case funds (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-9). 
(4) After Receipt of the Item by Repair Facility 
When the repair facility receives an item, a detailed inspection determines 
whether the cost of repair stays within the limit of “the current standard price, or 
acquisition cost as determined by [the] repair facility” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-8). If so, 
unserviceable materiel will be repaired in repair facilities and shipped back to the 
purchaser via an FF or as described in the LOA. If it is determined that the cost of repair 
exceeds the limit, it is considered beyond economical repair (BER), and the repair facility 
discontinues the repairing action. Notified by repair facility, RM contacts the customer 
and inform the current situation with the cost incurred to date, and request disposition 
instructions. In this case, all costs related to repair work before the item was defined as 
BER will be billed to the customer. After the RM requests for the disposition instructions 
from the customer in a BER letter, the purchaser has 45 days to respond about the 
unrepaired item with one of three possible resolutions: to continue to repair work, to 
return the item to the purchaser, or to dispose of the item (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-7-8). If 
the purchaser selects the disposal option, the RM will “direct the repair facility to ship the 
item to the nearest Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service” (p. 5-8). In this 
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situation, the items will be sold and the proceeds “will be used to help pay for the 
administrative cost of the disposal action” instead of been sent to purchaser (NAVSUP, 
2011, p. 5-8). If the purchaser does not respond in 45 days, the RM will direct the repair 
facility to ship the item to the FF. This shipment cost will be billed to the customer. 
During the repair, the latest repair and funding status of the item is tracked by the RM 
and provided to the customer via applicable WebRoR tracking record. 
b. Financial Responsibilities for Loss of FMS Repairables 
A repairable item can be lost during any stage of ROR. Policies for financial 
responsibility differ depending on the situation. In most situations, FMS customers bear 
the financial responsibility of the lost item. NAVSUP (2011) defined lost as follows: 
“The location or disposition of the asset is unknown, the repair facility does not have a 
record of the disposition of the asset, no one knows what happened to the FMS 
purchaser’s asset” (p. 5-10).  
The following explains the responsibilities in three different loss scenarios. 
(1) Loss of an FMS Repairable During Transportation  
The repairable item may be lost in transit to the repair facility or to the purchaser. 
In either case, the financial responsibility belongs to the purchaser (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-
10).  
(2) Loss of an FMS Repairable in a U.S. Repair Facility 
Repair action takes place in either a U.S. Navy facility or a commercial facility. If 
the item is lost in the U.S. Navy repair facility and the purchaser submits SDR with 
appropriate documentation, the USG will credit the value of the item to the purchaser. 
However, if the item is lost in a commercial facility, the purchaser will bear the financial 
responsibility, as outlined in the terms of the LOA. The USG may resolve this situation 
with a commercial contractor, but there is no guarantee (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-9). 
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(3) Disposal of an FMS Repairable by a U.S. Repair Facility without the Will 
of the Purchaser 
An FMS repairable can be disposed without the approval of purchaser. In this 
situation, the purchaser must submit an SDR. The responsibility will depend on the 
reason for the disposal. The USG, according to NAVSUP (2011) “will initiate an action 
to determine the reason for the disposal” after receiving the SDR (p. 5-10). 
If the disposal happened due to an error caused by a commercial repair facility, 
the purchaser assumes the responsibility as in a loss from a commercial facility. If the 
item was disposed of as a result of “the action or inaction of the USG,” then the USG will 
credit the value of the repairable to the purchaser (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-11). The USG 
also credits the purchaser if the item disposed in a U.S. Navy facility without approval of 
the purchaser (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-11).  
For the aforementioned situations, an SDR must include documentation that 
proves receipt of the item from the repair facility and be submitted within one year of the 
repair bill.  
3. Limitations on ROR 
There are three types of limitations: custom, time, and materiel. 
a. Custom Clearance and Licensing 
All items sent to the United States must clear customs. This can happen with or 
without a license depending on an item’s classification. Classified items require a license 
and approval from the DOD’s Directorate of Defense Trade Control while unclassified 
are exempt, according to 22 CFR section 123.4 (a) (5) of the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations. This license is required even if classified items are repaired in a third 
country such as Canada. The approval process involves obtaining different types of forms 
and clearances, as explained by NAVSUP (2011) in Chapter 5, Section 0502.  
b. Time Limitations 
Time limitation rules are the same as with DRP. Other than the required response 
times during the ROR requisition, there is no general time limitation for the repair case. 
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Even though the purchaser may require a specific time limitation for the case, the USG 
will continue to accept ROR requisitions if there is enough funds in it. This application is 
conducted with the same manner as in DRP cases (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 5-9).  
The only time consideration is the 180-day rule for idle cases. According to 
NAVSUP (2011), after one year following the implementation of the case, the Navy IPO 
will consider closing all idle cases with no requisitions for 180 days it has had no 
notification from the purchaser (p. 5-9).  
c. Materiel Limitations 
Items included as part of any U.S. Navy’s depot level repair program can be 
repaired under ROR. Other items may be repaired under ROR after the RM ensures that 
the U.S. repair capability exists and that the purchaser reimburses all the costs associated 
with the arrangement of this repair. In addition, most consumable items are not usually 
accepted for repair. However, when a purchaser establishes an RFRS for a consumable 
item, NAVSUP-WCC’s RM will check the standard price of the consumable item. It 
must be worth at least $5000 to initiate action to find a repair facility and obtain a repair 
price. Even after it is found eligible, there is no guarantee that the consumable items will 
be accepted for repair (NAVSUP, 2011, p.5-9).  
G. SUPPLY DISCREPANCY REPORTS 
Among all the FMS related issues, discrepancies take the most attention because 
of the dissatisfaction and frustration they cause customers. . NAVSUP (2011) asserted 
that because the U.S. supply system deals with such a high magnitude of supply 
operations, it makes many errors while handling FMS operations every year (p. 8-1). In 
cases of discrepancy, the purchaser must submit a Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR) as a 
formal request of correction.  
The following subsections explain the type of discrepancies, the discrepancy 
reporting process, as well as procedures and limitations on SDR submissions. 
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1. Types of Discrepancy 
There are five different discrepancy types under which each discrepancy report 
must fall: shipment, packaging, billing, and financial discrepancies, as well as quality 
deficiency reports (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-1).  
a. Shipment Discrepancies 
NAVSUP (2011) provided two categories of shipment discrepancies: carrier and 
shipper  (p. 8-2).  
(1) Carrier Discrepancies 
Carrier discrepancies happen when the quantity or the condition of the received 
materiel, that the purchaser receives, is different from the Bill of Lading or the Freight 
Bill. There can be a shortage in quantity or damage on packages or loose freight after the 
materiel has shipped from the U.S. facility. As mentioned before, the title of the materiel 
passes to the purchaser in the source of supply. Therefore, the USG is not responsible for 
carrier discrepancies. These discrepancies are not covered under the SDR and should be 
resolved with carrier. There are two carrier types for the transportation of materiel: 
commercial carriers or the U.S. Defense Transportation System (DTS). Therefore, claims 
should be initiated against either commercial carrier or DTS. For commercial carriers, the 
purchaser must resolve discrepancies through its contract with the carrier (NAVSUP, 
2011, p. 8-1). For DTS, the USG initiates a claim against the carrier without assuming 
any responsibility of replacing or repairing the discrepancy. The USG “either provides 
proof of shipment of materiel to the FMS purchaser or ensures that any credit due is 
processed to the purchaser’s account” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-2). 
(2) Shipper Discrepancies 
Shipment of the materiel occurs at the source of supply. The shipper can be either 
the USG depot or a commercial vendor. However, in both cases, the responsibility of the 
shipment belongs to the USG. Therefore, the discrepancy claims addressee should be the 
USG. Even though “there appears to be no difference between the quantity and condition of 
materiel received and the quantity and condition shown on the bill of lading or freight bill” 
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in the shipper’s discrepancies, the purchaser may receive damaged or wrong items or a 
different number of items than expected. While the USG is responsible for most 
discrepancies, some may be occur because the purchasers provided the wrong coding in the 
MILSTRIP documents. These types of flaws occur especially in the selection of substitute 
options and quantities for the item. The purchaser may or may not want to accept substitute 
items or unit of issue pack quantities instead of exact ones as outlined in the documents. If 
the purchaser mistakenly provides the wrong codes, the purchaser will be unsatisfied with 
what it receives. In this situation, the responsibility falls on the purchaser (NAVSUP, 2011, 
p. 8-2). 
b. Packaging Discrepancies 
Purchasers may receive damaged items because of the item’s “improper 
preservation, packing, marking, or unitization” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-3). These 
discrepancies are explained in Chapter 8 of NAVSUP’s guide. 
c. Billing Discrepancies 
The materiel may be “omitted from, incorrectly reflected, or duplicated on the 
FMS Billing Statement or FMS Delivery Listing,” even though it is received exactly as 
stated in LOA.” When a billing discrepancy occurs, the purchaser must ensure that 
NAVSUP-WSS receives a related SDR “within one year from the date of billing shown 
on the applicable DD Form 645, FMS Billing Statement” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-4). 
d. Financial Discrepancies 
Discrepancies over “either administrative charges or accessorial surcharges applied 
to FMS transactions” are considered financial discrepancies. These charges can be found 
on page 2 of the LOA. “Packing, Crating, and Handling (PCH) charges,…[i]nland, ocean, 
and air transportation charges,…[p]ort loading and unloading charges” are some examples 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-4). 
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e. Quality Deficiency Reports 
An FMS item may have a defect that “limits or eliminates the usefulness of” it (p. 
8-5). This kind of deficiency is called a product quality deficiency. This defect can be 
found in “design, specification, materiel, manufacturing, and workmanship” (NAVSUP, 
2011, p. 8-5). When the purchaser realizes that “any item which does not meet form, fit, 
or function, or any new item which does not work upon receipt/installation, or any 
repaired item which does not work upon receipt from the repair activity,” it should 
submit a Quality Deficiency Report (QDR) (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-8). For the defective 
repairable that returned to the purchaser from a repair in a U.S. repair facility with a 
problem, the purchaser may prepare QDRs for improper repair. 
2. Discrepancy Reporting Process and Procedures 
It is crucial for the purchaser to process discrepancies in the right way, as 
explained in all governing documents. When the problematic issue is not resolved for any 
reason, it may cause great dissatisfaction and frustration for the customer. One of the 
obstacles for resolve discrepancies is being able to submit a correct SDR. Incorrect SDR 
submissions cause not only a missed opportunity to correct the problem but also an 
administrative and financial burden. A misinterpretation is the most probable cause for a 
discrepancy. If the requisition and delivery instructions are not clear enough on the LOA, 
they can be misinterpreted by the U.S. supply system, which causes an overall decrease 
in quality and effectiveness of the FMS process. This is also the case for the SDR 
submission process. Without a thorough examination of the possible problems, the 
purchaser may decide that there is a discrepancy when really there is not. This kind of 
situation may occur for one of the following: inefficient communication between the 
purchaser and the FF, a partial shipment, a consolidated shipment, misunderstood 
shipment documentation, a quantity difference due to the units of issue, or receipt of a 
substitute item. Therefore, the purchaser should be meticulous in communicating with its 
FF and with all shipment tracking and transaction-related documentation (NAVSUP, 
2011, p. 8-6-8).  
The following subtopics explain the SDR process in brief.  
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a. Submitting an SDR 
A thorough investigation is of a great significance for determining both the 
existence of the discrepancy and the responsible party. After examining all possible factors 
that created the discrepancy, the purchaser initiates an action to resolve it with the 
responsible party. The responsibility may fall on the USG, the FF, or the purchaser. If the 
purchaser determines that the USG is responsible for the discrepancy, the purchaser must 
prepare and submit an SDR electronically with supporting information and documentation. 
Financial SDRs should be addressed to DFAS-IN/JAXBF, while all other types should be 
addressed to NAVSUPWSS (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-6-8). NAVSUP (2011) emphasized that 
when discrepancies occur after shipment from a U.S. facility, they are not the responsibility 
of the USG—since the title passes to the purchaser at the source of supply (p. 8-8). The 
only exception to this is for billing discrepancies (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-6-8). Moreover, the 
shipment date is the applicable date for considering the shelf-life of discrepancies. If the 
materiel was acceptable with enough shelf life on the shipment date, the purchaser should 
not submit an SDR. Figure 5 shows the logical diagram of the SDR process. Chapter 8, 
pages 10-21 of NAVSUP’s (2011) guide explained in detail how to complete an SDR form. 
To avoid misinterpretation, it is important to determine the type and category of 
the discrepancy. Categories of discrepancies are briefly mentioned in the following 
subtopic.  
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Figure 5.  Decision Flow Diagram for SDR Submission 
 
Source: Naval Supply Systems Command. (2011, August). Foreign military sales 
purchaser supply system guide NAVSUP publication 526 (Change 5). Retrieved from: 
https://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/ourteam/navsupwss/prod_serv/international/
FINAL_P526.pdf  
b. Categories of Discrepancies in SDR 
According to NAVSUP (2011), there are ten different discrepancy categories that 
should appear on front of the SDR. 
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(1) Condition of the Materiel 
In this category, after shipped from parcel post, received materiel should be either 
“in a condition other than the condition shown on the release/receipt document … [or] 
with insufficient shelf-life remaining at the time of shipment … [or] in damaged 
condition” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-4-5). 
(2) Supply Documentation 
In this category, the purchaser receives materiel “with no supply documentation, 
illegible supply documentation, or incomplete supply documentation” (NAVSUP, 2011, 
p. 8-5).  
(3) Misdirected Materiel 
According to NAVSUP (2011), “This category covers materiel that has been 
addressed to the wrong activity” (p. 8-5). 
(4) Overage/Duplicate Shipment 
In this category, the purchaser receives more materiel than requested because of 
either duplicate shipment or “incorrect item count within a container, box, or package.” If 
the excess materiel is caused by an incorrect item count, the purchaser may not 
understand the quantity difference between the transportation document and the real 
materiel until it opens the shipping container and checks the contents. Duplicate 
shipments are realized as soon as the item is received because the item is either sent in a 
consolidated shipment or separately with documentation (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-5). 
(5) Packaging Discrepancies 
According to NAVSUP (2011), if an item is damaged due to packaging defects, 
the purchaser should claim a packaging discrepancy (p. 8-5). 
(6) Product Quality Deficiency 
NAVSUP (2011) refers to this category of discrepancy as: “a defect that limits or 
eliminates the usefulness of an item … [which] includes defects in design, specification, 
materiel, manufacturing, and workmanship” (p. 8-5). 
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(7) Shortage of Materiel 
In this category, the purchaser receives less materiel than ordered. This occurs 
when there is either a short count within the received container or non-receipt of the 
materiel whatsoever. The short count type cannot be realized until the purchaser opens 
the container and checks the materiel (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-5). For non-receipts, the 
purchaser “must provide documentation from … [its] freight forwarder showing that the 
freight forwarder has not received any materiel against the requisition document number 
or Transportation Control Number (TCN) that applies” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-5). 
(8) Item Technical Data Markings 
In this category, the purchaser receives the item with “name plates, log books, 
operating handbooks, and special instructions are missing, illegible, or damaged … [or] 
missing or incomplete precautionary and operational markings, inspection data, operating 
data, and warranty data” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-5). 
(9) Wrong Item 
In this category, the purchaser receives a different item than requested. Substitute 
item receipts are not considered discrepancies unless explicitly stated in the LOA that the 
purchaser will accept it. This situation is explained by NAVSUP (2011) as follows: 
A substitute item is one that is authorized for issue instead of a standard 
item with similar characteristics. Such an item may be issued when the 
item ordered by the purchaser is not readily available. A substitute item 
may be unacceptable to the purchaser if it is not interchangeable with the 
item that was ordered. An interchangeable item is one that has the same 
physical and functional characteristics as the item ordered. An 
interchangeable item can be exchanged for the item ordered with little or 
no adjustment or alteration and little or no loss of operational efficiency. 
(p. 8-5) 
(10) Other Discrepancies 
If any discrepancy “includes the receipt of damaged materiel that was not shipped 
by parcel post … [or] that does not fall into any of the other nine categories of 
discrepancies described above,” considered in other discrepancies (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-
5). 
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c. Actions After Submitting an SDR 
NAVSUP-WSS records all SDRs upon receipt and informs the customer about 
the receipt of the original SDR (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-19). To determine the cause and 
responsibility, NAVSUP-WSS collects all necessary information from related 
organizations. Because this information-gathering activity takes time, after the 
acknowledgement of the receipt of the SDR, it requires a 90-day wait time for the 
purchaser to send an SDR follow-up. An SDR is not a MILSTRIP document; therefore, 
the purchaser should not submit a MILSTRIP follow-up for SDRs. The proper way to 
follow-up is to send a letter or message to NAVSUP-WSS (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-22).  
After information gathering and examining of the cause, if the USG determines 
that it is responsible for the discrepancy, “it will either take corrective action or make an 
adjustment to the purchaser’s account” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-8). While waiting for 
further disposition instructions from NAVSUP-WSS, discrepant materiel should be 
stored by the purchaser (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-19). 
The purchaser may be asked to send the discrepant materiel to a U.S. supply 
activity by NAVSUP-WSS. Upon receipt of the materiel with proper shipping 
documents, NAVSUP-WSS will initiate action to reimburse related shipping costs to the 
purchaser’s account (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-19). Return of the discrepant materiel may 
vary depending on the transportation selected by the purchaser. NAVSUP (2011) 
provided detailed information for this process in Chapter 8, page 23 of its guide. Because 
of the high volume of bureaucracy and paperwork, reimbursement of the shipping cost 
may take a very long time, which can create frustration and an administrative burden. To 
improve this process, the U.S. Navy encourages customers to use a commercial Internet-
based system for the SDR return process (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-23). NAVSUP (2011) 
asserted that this application can reduce the return process up to 180 days (p. 8-23). A 
cost-benefit analysis and the effectiveness of this application are outside the scope of this 
research.  
After negotiation over corrective action against the QDR for improperly repaired 
or defective repairables, the USG can request that the purchaser return the materiel for 
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further repair in a U.S. repair facility along with documents proving the improper repair. 
Being sure on the cause and evidence of the discrepancy is very important because the 
purchaser will be responsible for all associated costs for diagnostic-related repair work if 
it is concluded that the defect was not caused by improper work (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-
22). If there is an urgent need for the materiel, the purchaser may request for a prompt 
handling of the discrepancy. According to NAVSUP (2011), the USG “will make every 
effort to expedite such requests” (p. 8-22). This means that prompt handling is not 
guaranteed.  
All actions for materiel, billing, and materiel adjustments against SDR claims are 
recorded and reported to the customer with an FMS reply listing to purchaser requests for 
adjustments by DFAS-IN/JAXBF. This listing is also sent to customers attached to their 
FMS Billing Statement in addition the copy ones that are sent separately for each FMS 
case that has SDR actions (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-19). 
d. Reconsideration Request and Contest to SDR Responses 
The purchaser may request reconsideration if it receives an unsatisfactory 
response to its discrepancy report. The purchaser has 45 calendar days to submit its 
reconsideration request after the SDR reply date. In the reconsideration request, an 
appropriate explanation and supporting documents should be provided. After reviewing 
these, the U.S. supply system will provide a decision for either corrective action or 
rejection. For a rejection, the purchaser will receive an explanation (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 
8-26-27). If the response for reconsideration is unsatisfactory for the purchaser, the next 
step is contesting the decision. To better support its stance, the purchaser should add all 
new explanations and documentation to the request to contest the SDR. Again, the 
purchaser has 45 calendar days to submit its request to contest the SDR after the response 
for its reconsideration request (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-27). 
3. Limitations on SDR Submissions 
There are three different types of limitations on SDR submissions: dollar, time, 
and categorical limitations.  
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a. Dollar Limitations 
There is a minimum dollar value for SDR submissions in order to be processed. 
Regardless of the type of discrepancy, the total dollar amount of the discrepancy must be 
equal to or greater than $200. NAVSUP (2011) indicated that submitting all SDRs, no 
matter the value, is beneficial for documenting the problems with the system (p. 8-9).  
b. Time Limitations 
According to standard T&C in an LOA, the purchaser has one year to submit an 
SDR after the title transfer during the shipment. When the purchaser does not receive the 
entire unit of issue of materiel, the one-year limit starts with the date of either the title 
transfer or billing, whichever date is later. All SDRs that are submitted after this one-year 
period are rejected without any further review (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-9). When the 
purchaser uses an FF for handling and shipping the materiel, the FF activities may take a 
long time, which decreases the purchaser’s time to report discrepancies. The purchaser 
must be careful about this situation and may add a clause to its contract that authorizes an 
FF to submit SDRs on its behalf (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-25-26).  
There are two exceptions for this time limitation: “unusual circumstances 
involving latent defects [and] time limits for reporting deficiencies related to contractor 
warranties defined in individual contracts and/or warranty clauses” (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 
8-10). The following explains these exceptions. 
(1) Latent Defects 
Some materiel has manufacturing flaws that cannot be found by physical or other 
examination but are discovered during first use. Because some materiel is requisitioned 
for stocking purposes, sometimes their defects are not recognized until after the one-year 
SDR submission limit. When this happens, NAVSUP-WCC accepts SDR submissions 
even though the time limit has expired (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-10).  
(2) Warranties 
If there is a contractor warranty that covers the item, this warranty time limit will 
be considered instead of the one-year submission limit regardless of the length of the 
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warranty. All warranty-related documents must be submitted with the SDR. Normally, 
contractor warranties are only supplied for procured items, not U.S. stock items 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-10). 
c. Categorical Limitations 
Submission addresses of the financial and carrier discrepancies are limited. 
Financial SDRs should be submitted only to DFAS-IN/JAXBF, while carrier SDRs 
should not be submitted at all (NAVSUP, 2011, p. 8-10). 
H. ALTERNATIVE METHODS 
There are various programs and organizations through which materiel and 
services can be obtained as an alternative means to FMS, DRP, and ROR. These include 
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Disposition 
Services, World Wide Redistribution Services (WWRS), and the Repairable Item 
Replacement Option (RIRO). In this section, these programs and organizations are briefly 
explained. 
1. Direct Commercial Sales 
DCS is the other way to obtain U.S. defense articles and services in addition to 
FMS. Under DCS, the purchaser countries enter into business relationships with U.S. 
commercial vendors without any USG involvement. The USG has no preference between 
FMS and DCS. Both programs are considered fundamental foreign policy tools for the 
USG. Furthermore, it is also an option to use a combination of both programs for 
procurement. For example, sustainment support for FMS items can be acquired via DCS. 
Most U.S. defense articles can be obtained through DCS. Some items are categorized as 
FMS-only; therefore, those items cannot be procured under DCS. Also, U.S. commercial 
vendors must have arms export licenses in order to sell defense materiel to other 
countries. For DCS, all administrative efforts are performed by the purchasers. Both FMS 
and DCS have some advantages and disadvantages that the purchaser should consider 
during the selection process (DISAM, 2015, Chapter 15). Many details and consideration 
about the DCS are outside the scope of this research. Chapter 15 of DISAM’s (2015) 
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publication clearly explained the characteristics of DCS. See the Appendix for potential 
advantages and considerations of DCS (Table 5). 
2. DLA Disposition Services 
According to DISAM (2015), DLA Disposition Services primarily provide a 
disposal service for excess DOD materiel. The organization aims to “maximize the reuse 
of excess property” (p. 10-29). FMS purchasers are some of the many organizations and 
agencies that can buy this property. After the demilitarization of the excess items, DLA 
Disposition Services put the items for screening for 42 days. During this screening 
period, one of the eligible parties may buy the materiel. If materiel is not purchased, it is 
liquidated in other ways or destroyed. The condition of the materiel varies from new to 
scrap. The condition is the measurement of the price. Administrative charges are applied 
to the materiel prices. All materiel is sold “as is, where is” (DISAM, 2015, p. 10-29). No 
DLA repair or overhaul is available for this materiel. Therefore, the purchasers must be 
careful about its condition. The preferred method for buying this materiel is to establish a 
blanket order (DISAM, 2015, p. 10-29). DISAM (2015) stated that interest in this method 
of buying U.S. materiel has increased (p. 29).  
3. WWRS 
Under the WWRS program, FMS countries can sell their excess spare parts and 
support materiel bought under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to other FMS 
countries. This program aims to redistribute this excess materiel by creating a virtual 
warehouse through which FMS countries can list their wares. Without seeing each other’s 
identification, buyers and sellers conduct the transactions. An LOA is used as the 
authority for the purchase. When the item is bought, the seller is required to send it to a 
U.S. location. The title passes to the USG with the receipt and inspection of the item. 
After sanitizing the materiel, it is shipped to the buyer, and the title passes with shipment. 
This ensures that the transaction does not violate any “third-county transfer regulations” 
(DISAM, 2015, p. 10-32). 
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4. RIRO 
The U.S. Navy’s repair and replace program, RIRO, is an alternative repair 
procedure to ROR. Basically, RIRO is a procedure that can be applied to CLSSA cases 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 4-8). Instead of sending unserviceable materiel to the United States 
for repair under ROR procedures, the purchaser acquires the ready-for-issue materiel 
from U.S. stocks and, then, sends the unserviceable materiel for repair. After repair, the 
items are stocked in the U.S. stocks. If the item is unrepairable, the purchaser is charged 
the full price of the item sent (DISAM, 2015, p. 10-28). This program is restricted to U.S. 
Navy-managed maritime and aviation items. As in all CLSSA cases, an equity investment 
is required. In cases of discrepancy, an SDR should be submitted instead of a QDR 
(NAVSUP, 2011, p. 4-13).  
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III. ANALYSIS OF U.S./TN FMS PROCEDURES’ 
TRANSACTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides information about the Turkish Navy’s FMS DRP, ROR, 
and SDR transaction records’ data, explains how the analysis was conducted, and shows 
results of the analysis. This chapter begins with a brief summary of the data, statistical 
methodology, the limitations, and the analysis. Then, this chapter continues with an 
analysis of each dataset. The last section presents the result of the analysis.  
B. DATA SUMMARY 
In this research, three datasets were obtained from the Turkish Navy (TN)’s 
Foreign Procurement Department: 
 DRP transaction records between 2009 and 2015 
 ROR transaction records between 2007 and 2015 
 Discrepancy records, including SDR and QDR, between 2010 and 2015. 
1. DRP Data 
The DRP data include the transaction records of the TN between 2009 and 2015. 
The raw data, obtained from the TN’s Foreign Procurement Department, have 14 
different columns for transactions: obligation date, shipment date, established date, 
document number, suffix, transaction quantity, unit of issue, group and class, case, unit 
price, extended amount, latest status code, priority, and transaction control number. 
Figure 6 shows a sample from the data. The DRP data were provided only for statistical 
analysis purposes; therefore, they do not have the materiel’s national stock numbers or 
any other specific information for materiel use.  
The time interval between establishment and shipment dates, the transaction 
quantity, unit price, extended amount, priority, and the latest status codes were used 
during statistical analysis.  
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Figure 6.  Sample Rows and Columns from the DRP Data.  
 
Note: This data sample is provided to illustrate the original data. None of the content is 
real. 
2. ROR Data 
The ROR data include the TN’s historical transaction records for ROR. It is 
understood that the data were gathered according to the end date of transactions. The data 
start with the transactions that ended in 2010. However, it includes many transactions 
before 2011. This fact was considered especially during analysis of transaction time. The 
raw data, obtained from the TN’s Foreign Procurement Department, have 14 different 
columns regarding transactions: document number, financial number, quantity, unit of 
issue, case, transfer date to repair, unit price, approved repair cost, end repair cost, repair 
address, statute, inspection date after repair, service acceptance date after repair, and DL 
645 period. Figure 7 shows a sample from the data. The ROR data are provided only for 
statistical analysis purposes; therefore, they do not include the materiel’s national stock 
numbers or any other specific information for materiel use. 
Figure 7.  Sample Rows and Columns from the RoR Data. 
 
Note: This data sample is provided to illustrate the original data. None of the content is 
real. 
The time interval between the service acceptance and transfer date for repair, 
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ABCD12345678 FGHIJ401466005 1 EA ABC 1/1/10 $10,000 $750 $2,500 A12345 Closed 1/2/2010 1/3/2010 3/10
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3. Discrepancy Data 
The discrepancy data includes the TN’s discrepancy reports records between 2010 
and 2015. The raw data, obtained from the TN’s Foreign Procurement Department, have 
17 different columns regarding transactions: the discrepancy report, discrepancy date, 
discrepancy no, document number, suffix, NSN of wrong materiel, quantity, unit of issue, 
name of the materiel, case, statute, unit price, total price, QDR/wrong materiel transfer 
date, DL 645 charged, DL 645 credited, and explanation. Figure 8 shows a sample from 
the data. The discrepancy data were provided only for statistical analysis purposes. 
Figure 8.  Sample Rows and Columns from SDR Data. 
 
Note: This data sample provided to illustrate the original data. None of the content is real. 
The time interval between dates of discrepancy date, the DD 645 charged and 
credited, discrepancy total price, statute, discrepancy report, and explanation were used 
during statistical analysis. 
4. Limitations 
Significant limitations in data were discovered during the analysis. The analysis 
was limited by the size, content, and quality of the historical data records for the DRP, 
ROR, and SDR provided by the TN’s Foreign Procurement Department. These size and 
content limitations affected the range of outcomes. Each dataset had its own limitations 
that may have affected the margin of error. It was understood that all information about 
the transactions was not available in the dataset due to classification concerns. In general, 
the datasets lack information about the materiel used in transactions and the specific 
details of the transactions. Additionally, the quality of some of the data was low due to 































SDR 11/14/2012 ABC1234 ABCDE12345 A 12345678 2 EA Item ABC
Cr.Rfnd.
Closed 0.50 $ 1.00 $ 11/10/2011 2012‐09 2013/06 Wrong Material 
SDR 11/14/2012 EFG5678 FGHIJ67890 B 1 EA DEF
Cr.Rfnd.
Closed 3,000.00 $ 3,000.00 $ 2012‐09 2013/12 Less than Requested
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Therefore, these limitations led to an omission of some data and planned statistical 
analysis. Despite the fact that these limitations were an obstacle for the study, there was 
sufficient available data on hand to examine trends and meaningful relationships between 
variables. This availability combined with the importance of the issues found in the 
literature review renders the statistical analysis valuable to conduct. Because there is 
little, if no, previous research conducted at the scope of this study, statistical analysis of 
the data is of great significance for creating a foundation for future research. Limitations 
also provided the opportunity to describe the areas for future research. 
C. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
In this research, descriptive statistics and linear correlation were used to analyze 
the data. This research used some analytical approaches to explore the trends and factors 
that affected the efficiency of the procedures. The main purpose of these analyses was to 
understand the current situation of these procedures while showing whether major 
correlations exist between any of the variables. Descriptive statistics was used to provide 
quantitative summaries of data in order to present basic features of the datasets. Graphical 
presentations of the results were used to illustrate the data features. A univariate approach 
was used for descriptive statistics analysis. For determining the linear dependence of the 
variables on each other, linear correlation was used. Correlation analysis was applied to 
explore the strength of the relationship between independent variables. Prior to 
correlation analysis, missing or non-standard data were omitted from the datasets using 
either list-wise or pair-wise deletion, depending on the data size. 
Three datasets had different characteristics related to different processes and 
procedures. Therefore, analytic and statistical approaches used in analysis differ slightly 
among the datasets. During the analysis, Microsoft Excel was used. Whenever possible, 
the JMP Pro 2012 professional discovery program was used to eliminate possible typos in 
manual calculations. 
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D. ANALYSIS  
The following subsections explain the result of analysis of each dataset. Each 
dataset was analyzed according to some question that was prepared to support the 
research questions. 
1. DRP Data 
In analyzing the DRP data, this research aimed to answer four major questions to 
make further assessments: (1) What is the general picture of DRP transaction results? (2) 
How does the U.S. supply system respond to DRP orders from a timing perspective? (3) 
Is there a correlation between priority codes and response time? (4) Does transaction time 
have any correlation with other variables such as quantity, and total price amount of 
materiel ordered? 
a. The General Picture of DRP Transactions 
In the obtained DRP data, 22,038 transaction records existed. The transactions 
belonged to the time interval between 2009 and April 2015. In the following parts, 
univariate analysis was conducted column by column to show the general features of the 
data. 
(1) Distribution of Transactions Over the Years 
There are three different dates in a single transaction record: obligation date, 
shipment date, and establishment date. The establishment date, the date on which the 
transaction was established, was considered the start of the requisitioning for distribution 
analysis. Figure 9 shows a graphic created with the transactions over the years. For 2015, 
the data had approximately four months of transactions. Therefore, due to insufficient 
data, 2015 was not taken into consideration in the trend analysis. The trend analysis 
showed a slight downward trend for DRP transactions between 2009 and 2014. 
 66
Figure 9.  DRP Transactions Over Years 2009-2014 
 
 
(2) Priority Codes 
As mentioned in Chapter II, there are three different priority codes given to a 
transaction by the purchaser: 03- Extremely Urgent (Critical), 06-Urgent (Not Critical), 
and 15-Routine. In the dataset, there were 8,240 transactions (37.4%) categorized as 03-
Extremely Urgent, 13,792 (67.6%) categorized as 06-Urgent, and 6 (0.03%) categorized 
as 15-Routine code. Figure 10 shows the distribution of priority codes. 
(3) Total Dollar Values of DRP Transactions 
The Total dollar value of all transactions was $43,281,298.00. Total dollar values 
of transactions over the years were: $7,004,123 in 2010, $7.467.427 in 2011, $7,127,105 
in 2012, $4,903,390 in 2013, and 3,858,734 in 2014. Because2015 had approximately 
four months of transactions, it was not considered in trend analysis due to insufficient 
data. The total dollar amount of the transactions over the years exhibits a downward 
trend, as shown in Figure 11. 
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(4) Status of Transactions 
In the data, 29 different MILSTRIP status codes were found. NAVSUP (2011) 
provided detailed explanations of these codes in Chapter 2, pages 56-59 of its guide. For 
statistical analysis purposes, these codes were organized into three major categories: 
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processed, rejected, and cancelled. Then, these major categories were divided into other 
subcategories depending on the importance of the activity details. One hundred sixty-
three (0.74% of the total) were missing or non-standard and were deleted using a list-wise 
deletion. According to analysis of the remaining data, 20,247 (92.6% of the remaining 
total) transactions were processed, 921 (4.2% of the remaining total) transactions were 
rejected, and 707 (3.2% of the remaining total) transactions were cancelled. Among 
processed transactions, 16,034 (79.19% of the processed) transactions were processed 
and shipped, 3,540 (17.48% of the processed) transactions were procured and/or shipped 
directly from the contractor, 68 (0.34% of the processed) transactions had a quantity 
change, 306 (1.51% of the processed) transactions were backordered, 78 (0.39% of the 
processed) transactions were delayed, and 221 (1.09% of the processed) were forwarded 
to another activity. Among the various reasons for rejection of the transaction, major 
reasons were found as follows: unable to procure the item (280 transactions, 30.4% of the 
rejected), obsolete or inactive item (209 transactions, 22.69% of the rejected), and 
quantity related problems (149 transactions, 16.48% of the rejected). Cancellations were 
the result of requests from the purchaser. 
b. Time Lengths of Transactions 
In assessing the U.S. supply system’s response time length to for the TN’s DRP 
transaction requests, the time interval between date columns was used. During the 
analysis, the shipment date was used as the end of the response time for the U.S. supply 
system. For the rejected and cancelled transactions that did not have shipment dates, the 
obligation date was used as the end of the response time for the U.S. supply system. With 
this assumption, the life of the transaction was measured with the interval between the 
establishment date and the shipment or obligation date. This time interval was accepted 






Figure 12.  Status of DRP Transactions  
 
 
To eliminate missing or nonstandard data, all of the date columns were examined. 
Out of 22,038 transactions, 2010 (9.1% of the total) transactions had neither a shipment 
date nor an obligation date while 10 (0.5% of the total) transactions had nonstandard data. 
These missing and nonstandard data were eliminated by list-wise deletion. Descriptive 
statistics analysis showed that the average of the time interval between request and end of 
the transaction was 74.6 days. The maximum time interval was 1,947 days while the 
minimum was 0 days, which meant that the response happened within the same day. 
Figure 12 shows the histogram of DRP transaction time length. According to analysis, 
25.42% of total transactions ended in the first week, 47.69% of total transactions ended 
within 15 days, and 60.31% transactions ended within 30 days. In a one-year period, 
95.54% of the total transactions were completed. For further interval details, see Figure 
13. 
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Figure 13.  Histogram of the DRP Transactions’ Time Lengths 
 
 
c. Correlation Between Priority Codes and Response Time 
To show the strength of the relationship between response time length and priority 
codes of transactions, correlation analysis was conducted. In summary, the correlation 
coefficient, the measurement of correlation r, can fall between -1 and 1. The larger the 
absolute value of r, the more correlated the variables. Negativity and positivity indicates 
the direction of correlation. As a result of correlation analysis, the correlation coefficient 
(r) for time and priority codes was found to be -0.0008, which means there is almost no 
linear correlation. However, when the histograms and descriptive statistics of the priority 
codes over time were analyzed, it was observed that the positive skewness of the 
extremely urgent transactions was larger than that of the urgent transactions while the 
range of the extremely urgent transactions was slightly smaller than that of the urgent 
transactions. The distribution of the extremely urgent transactions over the response time 
length was slightly denser in terms of slower response time lengths. This means that 
extremely urgent transactions tended to have slightly slower response time lengths than 
urgent transactions (see Figure 14). 
 71
Figure 14.  Correlation Analysis Results and Descriptive Statistics of Urgent 
and Extremely Urgent Transactions Over Response Time Length 
 
 
d. Correlation Between Response Time and Other Variables 
To assess whether any relationship existed between the time length and other 
variables, a multivariate analysis was conducted. Other variables were transaction 
quantity and unit price. According to the results, the correlation covariance for time 
length and quantity was found to be -0.0118, and the correlation covariance for time and 
unit price was found to be 0.13850. These results suggest that there was no acceptable 
correlation between time and the other two variables. Figure 15 shows the results. 








Standard Error 1.247215362 1.565584244
Median 16 20
Mode 7 7
Standard Deviation 139.9940215 134.8039857










Time Length Quantity Unit Price
Time Length 1 -0.0118 0.1385
Quantity -0.0118 1 -0.0325
Unit Price 0.13850 -0.0325 1
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
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2. ROR Data 
In analyzing the ROR data, this research aimed to answer three major questions in 
order to make further assessments: (1) How is the general picture of ROR transaction 
records? (2) How long were the transaction times? (3) How is the consistency between 
estimated and final repair prices? 
a. General Picture of Repair Transactions 
In obtained ROR data, 545 transaction records exists. The transactions were part 
of the time interval between 2009 and April 2015. In the following parts, univariate 
analysis was conducted column by column to show the general features of the data. 
(1) Distribution of Transactions over Years 
There were four different dates in a single transaction record: the establishment 
date, the transfer date to repair, the inspection date, and the service acceptance date. The 
establishment date was considered the start for repair transactions, and the service 
acceptance date was considered the end of the repair transactions for distribution 
analysis. For 2015, the data had approximately six months of transactions. In addition, 13 
transaction records did not have any dates. Therefore, these 13 transactions and the year 
of 2015 were not considered in the trend analysis due to insufficient data. Because the 
data had been gathered according to its service acceptance date after 2011, it was 
concluded that the data did not contain all transactions prior to 2011. Therefore, 
transactions that started after 2011 were used in distribution analysis for thoroughness 
and preciseness. The quantities were calculated using transfer date to repair data. Figure 
16 shows the graphic created with the repair transactions over the years. A slight 
downward trend can be seen. 
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Figure 16.  ROR Transactions Over Years 2011-2014 
 
 
(2) Dollar Value of Repairs Over the Years 
In the data, there were three different types of price information: the unit price, 
the approved repair cost, and the final repair cost. The approved repair cost was the 
estimated repair service price that the TN had agreed to at the beginning of transaction. 
The final repair cost refers to the repair cost that was billed to the TN. The transactions 
that involved completed repair services had final repair cost data. Because the repair time 
and cost significantly varies depending on the materiel and malfunction, it was hard to 
perform a general cost analysis over the years. This reason caused too many missing and 
insufficient data cells, rendering the data unusable in cost analysis. Despite numerous 
attempts with different approaches, no logical results could be gained from a general 
distribution analysis.  
(3) Status of Transactions 
In the data, 9 different elements of status information were found. For statistical 
analysis purposes, these codes were organized into 6 categories. These categories 
included closed, repair cancelled, repair continues, waiting for billing, waiting for after-
repair acceptance, and disposal. Out of 546 transaction records, 247 (45.24% of the total) 
transactions were closed, 112 (4.2% of the total) transactions continued, 19 (3.48% of the 
total) transactions were cancelled, 118 (21.61%) transactions were waiting for billing, 44 
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(8.06%) transactions were waiting for after-repair acceptance, and 6 (1.10%) transactions 
were disposal. Figure 17 shows a pie chart to illustrate the distribution of repair 
transaction status. 
Figure 17.  Distribution of Repair Transaction Status 
 
 
b. The Time Length of the Transactions 
In the analysis of the time length of the transactions, the transfer date to repair 
was used as the starting point. Either inspection or acceptance date, depending on 
availability, was used as the ending point. 326 transactions had sufficient time data to 
assess the duration of transactions. According to descriptive statistics, the average length 
of the transactions was 615 days. Transactions were completed in a minimum of 110 days 
and a maximum of 2,455 days. See Figure 18 for descriptive statistics and Figure 19 for a 
histogram for ROR transaction time lengths. In the histogram, it can be observed that the 
time lengths were not distributed normally. It can be argued that there were double 
normal distributions with peaks in time intervals of 365 to 450 days and 900 to 990 days. 
In general, 82% of the transactions were completed after one year. In the first year, only 
18% of all transactions were completed. In the second year, 52% of all the transactions 
were completed while more than 20% of the all transactions were completed between 365 
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and 450 days. In the third year, approximately 25% of all the transactions were completed 
while nearly 12% of the all the transactions were completed between days 900 and 990. 
More than 5% of all the transactions were completed in the fourth year.  
Figure 18.  Descriptive Statistics of ROR Transaction Time Lengths 
 
 




















c. Consistency Between Estimated and Final Repair Prices 
In data, 188 transactions have both estimated and final repair prices. Among 
these, 9 transactions were excluded from analysis because they were either cancelled or 
disposed items. The final price for the cancelled and disposed items included all work 
completed before the decision was made. The remaining 179 transactions were used 
during the analysis. The difference between the estimated and final prices was calculated 
by extracting the estimated price from the final price. Because negativity can affect the 
statistical results, absolute values of all differences were used. According to the analysis, 
the average difference between estimated and final prices was $7,405.45. The maximum 
difference was $103,075 while the minimum difference was 0 (zero). In 69 (38.55% the 
of total) transactions, there was no difference between the estimated and the final repair 
prices. Thirty-two (17.88% of the total, 29% of the different ones) transactions had a 
negative difference, with total value of $144.791, while 78 (43.58% of total, 70% of 
different ones) transactions had a positive difference with the total value of $1.180.784. 
The average of the positive differences was $15,138 while the average of the negative 
differences was $4,525. Figure 20 shows a pie chart to illustrate the distribution of the 
differences between estimated and final repair prices. 





3. SDR Data 
In analyzing the SDR data, this research aimed to answer the following questions 
in order to make further assessments: (1) What is the general picture of the discrepancy 
records? (2) What is the quantity and dollar value of the discrepancies that were closed 
because of time or dollar value limitations? 
a. General Picture of Discrepancy Records 
In the obtained SDR data, 153 transaction records existed. Two transactions were 
list-wise deleted for missing data. The remaining 151 transaction were part of the time 
interval between 2010 and April 2015. Out of 151, 136 discrepancies were SDR-related 
while the remaining 15 discrepancies were QDR. A univariate analysis was conducted 
column by column to show the general features of the data. 
(1) Distribution of Transactions Over the Years 
There was only one date in a single transaction record. It was the discrepancy 
date. For 2015, the data had limited months of transactions. Therefore, reports belonging 
to 2015 were not considered for trend analysis due to insufficient data. The discrepancies 
were distributed over years as follows: three in 2010, 12 in 2011, 72 in 2012, 30 in 2013, 
and 24 in 2014. There was a significant increase in discrepancy reports in 2012. When 
the data for year 2012 was examined, it is found that more than half of the discrepancies 
had very low dollar values—less than $500. Figure 21 shows the graphic created with the 
discrepancies over the years. No linear trend was found. 
(2) Total Dollar Value of Discrepancies Over the Years 
The total dollar value of all discrepancies was $3,905,799.10. The total dollar 
values of discrepancies over the years were: $134,710 in 2010, $417,956.78 in 2011, 
$372,688.22 in 2012, $1,904,022.64 in 2013, and $417,341.05 in 2014. For 2015, the 
data had approximately six month’s records. Therefore, 2015 was not considered for 
trend analysis due to insufficient data. There was a significant increase in dollar value of 
the discrepancies in year 2013. When this anomaly was examined, it is found that one of 
the discrepancies belonged to very expensive item that had cost $1,600,000. When this 
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outlier was extracted from the total dollar value of the discrepancies of 2013, the total 
became $304,022.64 which is not very different than the other years. Therefore, a straight 
trend line was found when this outlier was ignored. The total dollar value of the 
discrepancies over years 2010-2014 are shown in Figure 22. 
Figure 21.  Distribution of Discrepancies Over Years 2010-2014 
 
 




(3) Status of the Discrepancies 
In the data, 5 different elements of status information were found. For statistical 
analysis purposes, this information was organized into two major categories: processed, 
and discrepancy continued. Then, these two major categories were divided into other 
subcategories depending on the importance of the activity details. According to the 
analysis, 128 (84.77% of the total) discrepancies closed and 23 (15.23% of the total) 
discrepancies continued.  
Among 128 closed discrepancies, 38 (29.69% of the closed) closed because of 
$200 dollar limit, 11 (8.59% of the closed) discrepancies closed because they exceeded 
the one-year discrepancy submission limit, 28 (21.88% of the closed) discrepancies 
closed with a credit refund to the purchaser’s funds, and 18 (14.06% of the closed) 
discrepancies closed with receipt of the materiel later due to either separate or later 
shipments. The remaining 33 (25.78% of the closed) discrepancies closed for various 
reasons such as return of the excess materiel received, a duplicate report, missing 
documentation, a rejection of discrepancy by the United States, a stock number change, 
or a change of the discrepant materiel. Among 23 continuing discrepancies, 13 (56.52% 
of the continuing) discrepancies were in process, 7 (30.43% of the continuing) were 
waiting for credit refund, and 3 (13.04% of the continuing) were waiting for service 
acceptance by the TN. See Figure 23 for the distribution of status of discrepancies; see 
Figure 24 for the total dollar values of discrepancies over the status of discrepancies. 
b. Quantity and Dollar Value of the Discrepancies Closed Due to 
Limitations  
According to the analysis, the total dollar value of 128 closed discrepancies was 
$2,862,090.90. The total dollar value of 49 closed discrepancies due to limitations was 
$50,221.26 (1.75% of closed). The dollar values of these discrepancies were as follows: 
38 discrepancies closed due to the $200 limit with a dollar value of $1,898.59 and 11 
discrepancies closed due to the one-year limit with a dollar value of $48,322.68.  
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Figure 23.  Distribution of Status of Discrepancies 
 




IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, findings from both the literature review and data analysis are 
presented.  
B. FINDINGS FROM DATA ANALYSIS  
Results of the analysis of each dataset revealed different findings. Because each 
dataset was related to different processes and procedures, the results were assessed 
accordingly.  
1. DRP Data 
In the general picture of the DRP data, especially in the distribution of the 
transaction over years, a downward trend was found. In parallel, the total dollar values of 
the transactions over the years also showed a downward trend. Both transaction quantities 
and total dollar values decreased significantly. 
The status of the transactions showed that most of the transactions (92%) were 
processed while only a small amount (4.7%) was rejected. The remaining transactions 
were cancelled by the purchaser. Most of the processed transactions (97%) were shipped 
and/or procured. 
The response time of the U.S. supply system to DRP transactions was impressive. 
A quarter of the transactions were processed within seven days. By day 15, nearly half of 
the transactions were completed. In the first 75 days, more than seventy-five percent of 
all transactions were completed. Most of the transactions (95.5%) were completed within 
one year.  
A third of the priority codes given by the TN were extremely urgent, and those 
remaining were urgent. Routine transactions were of insignificant quantity. Correlation 
analysis did not show any significant correlation between priority codes and response 
times. However, other analysis showed that the transactions with extremely urgent codes 
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tended to be completed in less time than urgent transactions. In addition, the range of the 
extremely urgent transactions was less than that of the urgent transactions. This study 
concludes the reason for the lack of a strong correlation between priority codes and 
response time is the U.S. supply system’s quick responses to most transactions.  
2. ROR Data 
In the analysis of the data that has sufficient time information, time lengths of the 
repair transactions were found to be very long. This return-of-repairable data showed that 
repair transactions had the potential to impact the TN in terms of readiness and cost. The 
average length for transactions was 615 days, and less than twenty percent of the 
transactions were completed in the first year. More than half of the transactions were 
completed in the second year, and approximately one quarter of the transactions were 
completed in the third year. Transaction length consists of the time that passed during 
shipment, all repair-related work, and inspections. The purpose of the repair services is to 
repair an unserviceable end item (SME or MDA) or spare parts. The very long length of 
ROR transactions can have two detrimental effects for the TN: a decrease in its readiness 
levels and an increase in the amount of spares to be stocked.  
Most of the time, if an item fails, it is immediately replaced by the spare one. 
Then the failed item is repaired and used as a spare again. This practice reduces the 
number of spares to be stocked, thus cost effective. The required repair time for 
repairable items is considered in spare quantities and the spare-part procurement process 
(Jones, 2006). Because most of the end items are highly expensive, it is very costly to 
maintain a high number of spares. Therefore, repair of an unserviceable end item has 
great importance at the macro level. When an end item or system fails, its operational 
availability decreases if not disappears totally, causing a drop in the readiness of the TN 
to satisfy its operational needs. While waiting for the repair of the items during long ROR 
transaction time lengths another failures may occur, and spares may become insufficient. 
This poses a high risk for readiness levels. Therefore, this situation requires the TN to 
keep more spare parts. Additionally, long time lengths of ROR transactions may create 
administrative uncertainties, especially for planning activities. As a consequence, 
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application of ROR for FMS items may cost a lot more than predicted, thus making 
organic national repair capabilities less costly and more attractive to the TN. 
In addition, repair work varies depending on the malfunction and complexity of 
the materiel. Therefore, it is very hard to come up with a general conclusion about the 
repair work itself. However, it can be concluded that the time length of the repair 
transactions are very long and should be shortened.  
Distribution of the repair transactions over years showed a slight downward trend. 
Most of the transactions had either been closed or had continued. Small amounts were 
cancelled or categorized for disposal.  
In the distribution analysis of the differences between estimated and final repair 
prices, it is found that nearly forty percent of the transactions that had sufficient price 
data were completed for the estimated price. Among the transactions that were completed 
for different prices, the majority (70%) had a higher final price than the estimated one. 
The total positive difference—in which the final price was higher than the estimated 
one—was more than eight times the total negative difference—in which the final price 
was lower than the estimated one. Despite the difficulty of the repair price estimation due 
to uncertainties, the analysis showed that the U.S. supply system price estimation did not 
perform well.  
3. SDR Data 
Distribution analysis of discrepancies over years and the total dollar values over 
years did not show any trends. There were unusual increases in discrepancy amounts in 
2012 and in total dollar values in 2013 due to an outlier. There may have been various 
factors affecting these results. Therefore, no conclusions are possible. 
Approximately 85% of the discrepancies were closed. Among these, nearly 30% 
was closed because their prices were under the $200, and nearly 9% of the closed 
discrepancies were closed due to a submission after one year. Although the dollar value 
of these closed discrepancies due to the limitations was very low, they account for nearly 
40% of the discrepancy submissions. The dollar value of the discrepant materiel is not the 
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measure of its importance to the users. Therefore, discrepancies rejected due to 
limitations should not be ignored just because their dollar value.  
C. FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, findings from the study are presented in four subsections: history; 
the overall FMS process; DRP, ROR, and SDR; as well as alternative methods. 
1. History 
Turkey has had deep ties with the United States in arms transfers. This 
relationship can be traced back to the roots of SA and the FMS program. Turkey has seen 
the United States as a primary arms supplier to modernize its military. However, the 
bitter taste of political events, like the President Johnson’s letter to the Turkish prime 
minister and the U.S. arms embargo to Turkey between 1975 and 1978, has drastically 
changed Turkey’s view toward foreign arms transfers. Especially after the embargo, 
Turkey began to build its own defense industry in order to become self-sufficient in arms 
supplies. Today, there are enormous efforts to maximize the indigenous capabilities for 
the defense materiel. The TN is one of the leading organizations of these efforts, with 
many national projects, systems, and platforms under its purview. Therefore, the 
sensitivity toward foreign purchases is significant. At the same time, many U.S. systems 
exist within the TN’s inventory, which requires continuous support. 
2. The Overall FMS Process 
FMS is a well-structured and highly regulated program governed by U.S. law. 
These features create a high level of bureaucracy while causing very long time delays for 
transactions. In addition, FMS can be affected by temporary political trends and lobbyism 
in the United States because of the USG and the U.S. law-making authorities oversee the 
process. For third party beneficiary rights, the double contractual agreements in FMS 
create a disproportionate burden on purchasers because the LOA is an international 
agreement without the force and effect of the law. 
In the FMS program, the purchaser must oblige every T&C written into the LOA. 
Most of the terms and conditions put heavy responsibilities on purchasers while 
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providing no flexibility—except for sole source selection. Moreover, T&Cs related to 
limitations, title transfer, administrative surcharges, and the best effort principle creates 
stress on the transactions. In fact, many of the USG’s actions in FMS, including the 
determination of timelines and prices based on the USG’s best effort, disfavor the 
purchasers due to the uncertainties they cause. There are three types of FMS cases: 
defined order, blanket order, and CLSSA. Both DRP and ROR are based on blanket 
orders. The USG conducts business with a no profit, no loss principle, with an aim to not 
profiting from the transactions while incurring no costs to U.S. taxpayers. However, in a 
DISAM journal article, Froman (1987) indicated that the “unanticipated expenses [of the 
transactions from DOD stocks] becomes the purchaser’s financial problem” (p. 92) 
especially in case of discrepancies. Froman, (1987) underlined that there should not be 
any excuse for “defective performance under a contract for sale of good … [and USG’s] 
good faith performance and absence of knowing misconduct are not enough” (p. 93). 
While there is no transparency and or certainty over the administrative efforts and 
associated costs, the USG charges customers an administrative surcharge based solely on 
a percentage of the total price of the item to make the transactions free to U.S. taxpayers. 
In two reports, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO; 1999; 2009) pointed 
out the inefficiencies of DOD regarding FMS. One of the report (1999) indicated that 
“[DOD] does not have the sufficient information to determine the administrative costs 
associated with FMS” (p. 3). Another report published ten years later strongly echoed this 
finding again as “DOD lacks the information needed to effectively administer and 
oversee the FMS program….Within the last 10 years, DOD twice adjusted the surcharge 
rate…without knowing if the rates reflect the true cost the administer the program.”(p. 3).  
The U.S. Navy supply system provides materiel and services to FMS purchasers 
as if they were U.S. customers. The intention of this approach is to provide standard U.S. 
supply support to the purchasers; however, this support may have problems and 
insufficiencies that disappoint the customers. It is mentioned in a recent GAO (2015) 
report that the “DOD’s inventory management practices and procedures have been 
ineffective and inefficient,…[DOD supply chain management has] unmet delivery 
standards and time lines for cargo shipments as well as incomplete delivery data for many 
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surface shipments,…weaknesses in maintaining visibility of supplies” (p. 184). Another 
GAO report (2010) points out that DLA has “unresolved problems with accurately 
estimating lead times needed to acquire spare parts” (Preface). Therefore, understanding 
the FMS process and the U.S. supply system is extremely important for FMS purchasers 
to experience successful transactions. 
3. DRP, ROR, and SDR 
The U.S. Navy’s DRP process and procedures follow simple logic to procure 
support materiel under FMS. Its basic structure as a blanket order helps to eliminate some 
of FMS’s bureaucracy, thus helping to expedite transactions. It is limited, however, to the 
support materiel for FMS end items. 
The ROR process provides repair services for most FMS materiel. The 
transportation of unserviceable materiel to and from the United States poses risks to 
success of the program due to possible problems in timing and title transfers.  
The SDR is the procedure to report discrepancies for FMS-related transactions. 
There are various types and categories of discrepancies. The completeness of the 
information provided and adherence to the instructions are vital for the success of the 
process because the USG is final authority for discrepancy outcomes. Discrepancies that 
have been valued at less than $200 or submitted one year after the transaction are rejected 
without further review.  
4. Alternative Methods 
DCS is an alternative way for obtaining U.S. materiel and services. In contrast to 
government-to-government relationships in FMS, purchasers go directly into business 
with U.S. commercial vendors. When compared to FMS, DCS has advantages and 
disadvantages. The purchaser must perform all administrative efforts without the help of 
the USG. Instead of applying DCS to all intended transactions, the purchasers use it 
depending on the materiel and situations. 
DLA Disposition Services try to sell the disposed U.S. materiel to eligible 
organizations and programs. There is no continuous supply for these items. Availability is 
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uncertain, and the condition of the materiel varies. Materiel is sold as is, and the price 
depends on its condition. Materiel is listed for a limited time. Therefore, DLA 
Disposition Services is found as an useful option that should be considered before 
starting transactions under other programs; however, it should be considered a 
supplemental tool, not a total replacement. 
WWRS is a program in which FMS countries buy excess materiel from other 
FMS countries. There is no continuous supply for materiel since the sales are only for 
excess materiel, and availability varies. In addition, the process involves materiel 
transportation to and from the United States. Therefore, WWRS is found as an useful 
option that should be considered before starting transactions under other programs. 
However, it should be considered a supplemental tool, not a total replacement for other 
programs. 
RIRO is a repair and replacement program administered by the U.S. Navy. Under 
RIRO, customers receive materiel promptly instead of waiting for unserviceable items to 
be repaired. However, because RIRO is part of CLSSA cases it cannot be a supplemental 
tool for other programs. RIRO can be added to a CLSSA case which was designed to 
satisfy support materiel needs for FMS end items. Therefore, a comprehensive CLSSA 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS OF 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the research questions presented earlier and provides 
conclusions and recommendations to improve the existing state of the U.S./TN DRP, 
ROR, and SDR. As this paper is limited in scope and data, areas for further research are 
explored as well. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This research is concluded in the following subtopics in an effort to answer the 
research questions. 
1. The General Picture of the US/TN’s FMS Program and the Current 
State of its Associated Procedures 
The significance of SA and the FMS program has been beneficial for both the 
United States and purchaser countries. Traditionally, FMS is seen as one of the main 
tools for reaching the foreign policy and national security goals of the United States and 
purchaser countries. However, this approach lacks to mention the importance of its side 
effects on not only defense industries of both the buyer and seller but also internal public 
policies. As an ally of the United States and a NATO member, Turkey has fulfilled many 
of its security needs via FMS. However, history has shown that momentary political 
decisions of the United States regarding FMS have affected Turkey’s view toward 
foreign arms sales in a negative direction. In parallel to this fact, the Turkish Navy (TN)’s 
attitude toward FMS is still under the effect of the U.S. Congress’ recent politic decisions 
that were made with short-term interests and lobbyism. In Turkey, rigorous efforts have 
been made to build up the national defense industry since the U.S. arms embargo of 
1975-1978. These efforts involve not only major end items, such as national corvettes 
and frigates, but life-cycle support materiel as well. Additionally, the U.S. supply system 
conducts its business for FMS purchasers as it does for U.S. components. The intention 
of this approach is to ensure FMS purchasers not treated less than U.S. customers. 
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Despite the positive intentions of this approach, they actually create risks for the success 
of the FMS program because standard U.S. supply support has many problems and 
insufficiencies that were, as indicated in recent GAO reports. Moreover, this approach 
neglects to ameliorate situations between the USG and purchaser countries like Turkey. 
Under the sensitive climate, any problem or dispute in the U.S. supply system may 
significantly affect the purchasers by changing their overall view of the FMS and the 
United States as arms suppliers.  
A high level of bureaucracy in the FMS program creates an enormous 
administrative burden that can cause delays, misunderstandings, and disputes. Purchasers 
do not have third party beneficiary rights to pursue judicial resolutions for disputes with 
commercial vendors as a result of double contracting and the LOA’s lack of force and 
effect of law.  
Unanticipated expenses becomes the purchaser’s financial problems as a result of 
the no profit, no loss principle. There is neither transparency nor certainty regarding U.S. 
administrative efforts while the USG charges customers with an administrative surcharge 
as a certain percentage of the item price. The “best effort” concept in T&C of the LOA 
serves as a protection for the USG in cases of misconduct unmet costs and schedules. 
Good faith performance and the absence of the misconduct are considered excuses under 
the FMS contractual agreement. In addition, to problems created with no loss, no profit 
and best effort principles, other strict rules and limitations stress the process while tying 
the hands of the purchasers, causing dissatisfaction. Extreme inflexibility for the 
purchaser leaves no option but to consider other methods and suppliers. The United 
States declares its preference that friend and ally nations to choose the United States as a 
supplier for defense materiel; however, FMS’s design, which is vulnerable to U.S. 
politics, is pushing the purchaser away from the United States. 
Analysis of the DRP data on hand showed that the U.S. supply system’s response 
to DRP requests from the TN is impressive, especially with timing considerations. 
Although it was found that the DRP is simplified and effective as intended, there was a 
downward trend in the TN’s DRP transaction records. Without a comprehensive trend 
analysis with complete data, it is unwise to form conclusions based solely on this 
 91
analysis. Nevertheless, this trend can be perceived as an indication of the results of both 
the TN’s efforts for improving its indigenous capabilities and the U.S. Congress’s 
continued decisions not to give frigates to Turkey. Success of the TN’s national ship 
programs and its efforts of maximizing the indigenous support elements, combined with 
ongoing decommissioning of old U.S. ships in the TN’s inventory, could be the reasons 
for the downward trend yet success of the procedures. 
From the analysis of the ROR data, it can be concluded that the average time of 
the length of ROR transactions—consisting of repair-related work and time spent during 
administrative works and transportation—is very long. Since the repair-related work 
varies significantly depending on the malfunction, the administrative work and 
transportation may be the main contributors to the long transaction time lengths. This 
long time lengths create a risk for the TN’s readiness while requiring more spare parts. 
As a consequence, ROR may be more costly to the TN than previously considered. 
Moreover, the difference between prices of estimated and final repair work is unpleasant 
for the customer since it affects budgeting. 
The number of discrepancy transactions, which were rejected because of time or 
dollar limitations, is very high. Although their dollar value was low, this high quantity of 
rejections due to limitations creates frustration and disappointment at the user and 
administrative levels for the purchaser. The fact that there are many low-cost items with 
discrepancies could indicate quality control problems for inexpensive commodities in the 
U.S. supply system. Furthermore, a low-cost item can be part of a high-cost end item. In 
addition, low-cost discrepant materiel could be part of a high-cost end item. This 
discrepant materiel can affect operational readiness depending on the situation. Thus, the 
effects and importance of the rejected discrepancies—solely for the dollar or time 
limits—can cost far beyond from their monetary values. Additionally, FMS transactions 
create many discrepancies, showing the inefficiency of the U.S. supply system. In 
support, GOA reports repeatedly underline this inefficiency. Doing business in good faith 
with best efforts could be one of the contributors to these discrepancies. Despite the 
aforementioned problems, discrepancy handling by the U.S. Navy after a discrepancy 
emerges seems fairly good. 
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2. Suitability of Alternative Methods for Procurement of U.S. Spares 
and Repairs Other Than FMS DRP and ROR 
This research defined four different alternatives methods for U.S. spares and 
repairs. Traditionally, DCS has been seen as the only method other than FMS. However, 
there are also other means to buy spares and repair services within or related to the FMS 
program. DCS, WWRS, and DLA Disposition Services methods lack the wide range of 
materiel and services for which FMS provides access. DCS may eliminate the 
bureaucracy and shorten the time length of the transactions, but it requires the purchaser 
to perform special care and administrative attention during the business with commercial 
contractors. Both DLA Disposition Services and WWRS were found useful supplements 
that should be considered before starting a DRP transaction. Nevertheless, they cannot 
provide a complete alternative due to lack of materiel supply. A CLSSA case with the 
U.S. Navy’s RIRO procedures can be an effective alternative for both the DRP and ROR. 
Nevertheless, CLSSA requires costly upfront investments in U.S. supplies, which may 
not be suitable to Turkey due its limited budget. 
3. Summary 
In conclusion, the literature review and data analysis showed that FMS does not 
have efficient processes and procedures in place while it is certainly appreciated because 
of the value of efforts and good intentions. The GAO confirms that there are many 
problems in the administration and management of the FMS program by its own 
investigations. This costs in terms of money, time, and readiness, which has led the TN to 
look for other options. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As was found in the literature review, FMS does not evolve enough to satisfy the 
purchaser needs and expectations in this ever-changing world. It can be deduced from the 
conclusion about the general picture of the FMS program that the USG should institute 
reforms to improve the overall system that was structured and established decades ago. 
The literature review showed that sales of FMS support materiel and repair services are 
of great significance to purchaser countries and should not be ignored even though they 
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do not involve sales of end items. This research came up with the following 
recommendations for improving the existing state of Turkish FMS DRP, ROR, and SDR 
activities.  
1. Changes Needed in the FMS Structure and the LOA’s T&Cs 
The literature review points to the need for structural changes in the overall FMS 
structure in order for the United States to be more competitive in arms sales. In addition, 
the FMS process suffers from administrative and bureaucratic burdens. Thus, the 
unnecessary bureaucratic work should be eliminated to make the program and associated 
procedures more effective. Also, FMS countries should be given third party beneficiary 
rights to sue for reparations from U.S. commercial vendors. 
Many clauses in the standard T&Cs, including but not limited to the title transfer 
policy, limitations, and best effort principle, are written in favor of the USG and are 
obstacles for the success of the FMS program. Therefore, either the USG should reshape 
the T&Cs generally or the TN should negotiate to change them in the LOA development 
process to ease suffers it experiences. Because it was found that the title-transfer policy 
of the materiel stresses both the system and the purchasers by creating discrepancies and 
putting the responsibility burdens on the purchasers, it should be restructured. In the data 
analysis, it was found that many discrepancies were rejected due to the $200 and the one-
year limitation without any further review. Limitations on transactions should be eased if 
not eliminated: $200 and one year limitations for discrepancy submissions should be 
removed as a result of the disappointment and frustration they may create. The USG 
should conduct business with more certainty instead of with its best effort. The 
uncertainty and the protection, which the best effort concept creates, affect the 
purchaser’s planning activities and decrease its trust toward the United States. To 
strengthen the trust of its purchasers, the USG should assign administrative surcharges 
according to the real administrative work and eliminate the best effort principle from the 
T&Cs in the LOA. While doing business at the micro level, the U.S. supply system 
should consider macro-level sensitivities and situations. It is understood from findings 
that the U.S. supply system provides same service for the customers: however it has 
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problems and inefficiencies. Therefore, the current trends and view of the TN toward 
foreign arm sales should be taken into consideration and transactions should be handled 
with more understanding and care by U.S. supply system. 
2. Improving the Turkish National Industry for Spares and Repairs 
To alleviate suffer it faces from costly and lengthy foreign purchases, the TN 
should speed up and increase its efforts to gain its indigenous resources and capabilities 
for spare parts and repair services. The literature review and the data analysis uncovered 
many practices in the FMS process that are structured in favor of the United States, which 
eliminates the fairness of the activities on the commercial side. In particular, the title 
transfer policy, the many restrictions over the use of materiel, and limitations on 
discrepancies stress the purchasers to a great degree. In addition, the data analysis 
showed that the ROR has significant time lengths put the TN’s readiness levels at risk 
and increase the costly need for keeping more spare parts. When the effects of the 
politics, currency differences, budget restrictions, problems in the FMS program, and 
increased operational needs are evaluated, it is easy to see that the TN needs to acquire 
more indigenous capabilities to fulfill its spare part and repair service needs for time and 
cost effectiveness.  
3. Increasing the Use of Alternative Methods 
The literature review and data analysis showed that the U.S./TN FMS procedure 
can create problems and disappointment while alternative methods do exist. To alleviate 
the problems it faces, the TN should utilize other means for obtaining spare parts and 
repair services. In the literature review, DCS and CLSSA were found worthy for 
supplying some important types of materiel. In addition, due to the possible time and cost 
savings from WWRS and DLA Disposition Services, the availability of needed materiel 
in those programs must be checked before a DRP transaction request is made. 
D. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research was conducted with limited scope and data. Therefore, the 
following actions for further research are recommended:  
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 Increase the size, completeness, and details of the datasets to reveal factors 
affecting the results,  
 Conduct an analysis to identify the responsible parties for the long time 
lengths of ROR transactions,  
 Investigate whether the structural improvements are possible in the FMS 
program,  
 Conduct an analysis of the TN’s structure for FMS DRP, ROR , and SDR 
to explore areas for improvement,  
 Evaluate the detailed processes of the alternative methods to make a 
comparative analysis of FMS’s DRP and ROR, and 
 Investigate the current availability of the Turkish spare parts and repair 
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APPENDIX. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
OF DCS 
Table 5.   Potential Advantages and Considerations of DCS 
Potential Advantages Considerations 
Potential for fixed delivery or fixed price, with 
penalty if contractor fails 
Requires considerable experience and 
sophistication by country negotiators. 
Business-to-business relationship allows country 
to negotiate cost and contract terms. 
If closer military-to-military relationships are a 
purchaser’s objective, FMS provides an 
avenue to achieve this objective. 
Direct negotiations with contractor can result in a 
quicker response. 
Requires considerable experience and 
sophistication by country negotiators. 
Generally better support for nonstandard items. Purchaser must decide upon desired degree ofstandardization with U.S. forces. 
More capability to tailor package to unique country
needs. 
Tailored package may detract from 
standardization desires. 
Continuity of personal contacts with contractor 
technical personnel. 
Value of continuity must be compared to the 
value of direct military-to-military contacts. 
New equipment directly from production line. Option exists to request only new and unused items via FMS. 
Lower prices possible under certain 
circumstances. 
Final price may be dependent on experience 
and sophistication of country contract 
negotiators. 
Generally fixed payment schedule which eases 
budgeting problems. 
Payment schedules may be more front-loaded
than under FMS. 
Purchaser can include offset provisions in one 
contract. 
Purchaser can negotiate offsets (directly with 
contractor) and still procure under FMS. 
FMS administrative surcharge and DOD 
management costs can be avoided. 
Purchaser must consider entire cost of 
transaction, including its contracting staff costs
and possibly increased contract administrative 
costs. 
Commercial purchases of some types of items 
could help to create and develop a procurement 
capability. 
Scarcity of resources and time may not allow 
for retaining procurement staff. 
Source: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. (2015). The management 
of security cooperation (Green book) (34.1 ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Retrieved 
from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/greenbook.aspx 
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